The Impact of Nationalism on the Muslim World

Edited by
M. Ghayasuddin

Contents

Foreword

The Muslims, once leaders of a dominant civilization, today stand perplexed and polarized within themselves and dominated and exploited by foreign powers. *Mulukiyyah*, or hereditary monarchy, remained the dominant mode of political organization for the greater part of Muslim history. Alienated from the masses and becoming increasingly secular in outlook, the *malukiyyah* was always vulnerable. It was overrun by a rival and hostile power outside Islam when it could no longer defend the lands and societies of Islam. To make its gains permanent, the new power, western civilization, set about the task of dismantling the world of Islam. The political fragmentation of the *Ummah* was achieved by the imposition of the nation-State system. If, despite this, the disintegration has remained peripheral, it is because of the political culture of the Muslim masses, which has resisted the breakdown of their traditional societies.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran represents a turning-point in Muslim political history. The political culture of the Muslim masses, has reasserted itself in one part of the *Ummah*, breaking the strait-jacket of nationalism and the nation-State system. It is challenging and threatening the imposed status quo.

Nationalism is an alien concept and was unheard of in the world of Islam until a hundred years ago. It gained currency in the wake of colonialism. A new elite emerged in the Muslim world which became 'nationalist', 'westernized', 'secular' or even 'Islamic' under the influence of orientalism. Nationalism is the instrument of continued western control and domination over Muslim areas of the world. The new nation-States and their institutions function as an extension of colonial rule and in the interests of the colonial powers. The west has managed to keep the power of Islam divided and defused. The map of the Muslim world today is the map of nation-States in which 'nationality' and 'national interest' stand above Islam.

The six papers which comprise this book were presented at a world seminar on the Impact of Nationalism on the Ummah held in London from 31 July–3 August, 1985. The seminar was initiated by Dr Kalim

Siddiqui, Director of the Muslim Institute. His paper, the first, provides a framework to stimulate new lines of inquiry and action for Muslims. The second paper, by Murtaza Garia, explains how nationalism is viewed by the Qur'ān and Sunnah. This is followed by case-studies from the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South Asia and West Africa: Dr Mohamed Yehia gives a critique of the idea of Arab nationalism; Dr Hasan di Tiro discusses Dutch colonial Islamic policy and the birth of 'Indonesian nationalism'; Dr Dabla focuses on the experience of Kashmiri Muslims under oppression by the Brahmins (an elite cultivated by the British to succeed them in India); Malik N'Daiye deals with the French Islamic policy in West Africa.

This book should help to develop a better understanding of nationalism in the context of Islam and the Muslim political culture that has survived colonialism.

M. Ghayasuddin

The Muslim Institute
6 Endsleigh Street
London WC1H 0DS

17 June, 1986

About the Contributors

Dr Kalim Siddiqui is Director of The Muslim Institute, London.

Murtaza Garia is Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Education, Arts and Culture, Mauritius.

Dr Mohamed Yehia teaches English Literature at the University of Cairo, Egypt.

Dr Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro is President of the National Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra.

Dr Bashir Ahmed Dabla is Assistant Professor in Sociology at the Aligarh Muslim University, India.

Malik N'Daiye   is Director of Dawah, Jama'at Ibad ar-Rahman, Senegal.

Chapter I

Nation-States as Obstacles to the Total Transformation of the *Ummah*

Dr Kalim Siddiqui
Director, The Muslim Institute

Today we come face to face with perhaps the greatest evil that stalks the modern world—that of nationalism. This monster needs to be described and analysed in detail. Muslims throughout the world recognize the evil of nationalism in general terms, but there is little literature on the subject. In our universities nationalism is presented as a positive force that helped to accelerate the departure of the colonial powers. The fact of the matter is that nationalism either as a political doctrine or as a popular emotion was unknown to Muslims until about a hundred years ago. For 1,300 years before that, Muslims had established large States and empires and ruled over vast territories of the world without ever having to appeal to anything which even vaguely resembled modern nationalism. Nationalism is a force which leads to the disintegration of the human personality and society at all levels.[1] My views on the subject are well known; it is nearly 10 years since I wrote my paper, *Beyond the Muslim Nation-States.*[2]

I do not propose to undertake a detailed theoretical or philosophical examination of nationalism. My purpose is to take a pragmatic, empirical view of the state of the *Ummah* under the impact of nationalism. I am aware, of course, that nationalism is also the root of other common evils such as national socialism, national capitalism, national democracy and national culture.

Most of the world's major languages existed for hundreds of years before nationalism, and yet have come to be known as 'national' languages. The 'national' tag is now applied even to dress and food. We are, therefore, dealing with a disease that affects a wide variety of human behaviour. Nationalism has tried to capture the entire human personality at all levels—body, mind and soul. However, the poison of

nationalism has been injected, and continues to be injected and spread, through one and only one source: the control and manipulation of political power.

The point that has to be clearly understood is that the State is the ultimate source of all good and evil in any society. For the followers of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, this point should not need to be stressed. It is almost impossible to be a Muslim without either living in an Islamic State or being engaged in a struggle to establish an Islamic State. If one or other of these conditions is not met, then perhaps the bulk of the Sunnah of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, will be ignored. The end product of the Sunnah of the Prophet was the Islamic State of Medina. The message of Islam was completed not only in the Qur'ān, but also in the State created through a relentless struggle against the established power of *kufr*. The Islamic State is an essential and integral part of Islam. Indeed, Islam is incomplete without the Islamic State. Islam is not merely a set of rituals for personal piety, Islam is the Creator's own plan, prescription and prognosis for all mankind. A Muslim can neither live the 'good life' on his own nor pursue 'personal *taqwa*' in isolation. The Islamic State is Allah's chosen framework and the one in which the moral, political, social, economic and cultural goals of Islam are pursued by the Muslim *Ummah*.

All this is common ground among Muslims. There is, however, a great deal of confusion about how the Islamic State is established. On the face of it, the answer to this question too should be simple and easily understood by all Muslims.

The method of Allah's Messenger, upon whom be peace, ought to be as clear as the Divine Message. Confusion has, however, crept in and this is largely, though not entirely, due to the political dominance of the west over Muslim societies. Once under alien political tutelage, Muslim societies began to throw up intellectuals, philosophers and political leaders who also accepted the intellectual and cultural overlordship of the west. It must be noted that the west was not content with acquiring undisputed control of and dominance over the political, social and cultural structures that already existed in Muslim societies. The west's colonial ambitions included the outright abolition and destruction of all institutions in traditional Muslim societies. The colonial powers created 'colonial States' in the image of their European States. These colonial States then proceeded to establish European-styled administrative, military, economic, social, cultural

and educational institutions and structures. The people of the colonies were offered 'progress', opportunity and participation in the new order only if they learned European languages, acquired western education in European-styled universities, and generally accepted the European outlook and way of life. After this, if they also practised Islam strictly for personal piety, the Europeans did not mind.

The new Europeanized classes were also encouraged to look forward to a day when the European colonial States would be handed over to them as 'independent' States. But before the newly Europeanized colonials could be considered fit for political emancipation, they had to become nationalists. As nationalists they were encouraged to mix a little Islam with their otherwise secular politics. This was in any case necessary for communication with the 'backward' Muslim masses. Thus we came to acquire Muslim 'fathers of the nations' who are buried in expensive mausoleums in our capital cities. Some of them were also called 'kings'. The 'independence' they bequeathed to us was, and remains, little more than a continuation of the European colonial States. This brings me back to something I have said and written repeatedly during the last ten years. These colonial States, now called nation-States, are replete with national frontiers, national flags, national anthems, national days, national languages, national dresses, national cultures, national airlines, national histories and, above all, national interests. Every new 'nation' is defined in exclusivist terms. No two nation-States can have identical 'national interests'. The impact of this on the Muslim *Ummah* has been devastating. The political map of the *Ummah* today represents the globalization of the nation-State system.

It represents the defeat and dismemberment of the political power of Islam. More than that, it represents the continued political, economic, social and cultural dominance of the west over the lands and peoples of Islam. The loss of Palestine to Zionism was also made possible by the prior dismemberment of the *Ummah* into nation-States. A greater tragedy of this period is that there also emerged a number of 'national' Islamic parties. Nowhere in the world have such parties succeeded in attaining even modest goals within their chosen 'national' political systems. Nowhere in the world has an 'Islamic' political party succeeded in setting up anything that could even remotely be described as an Islamic State. In my view, the 'Islamic parties' were and remain a peculiar product of the colonial period. What we must all recognize is that the founders of these

'Islamic parties' were men of great learning, integrity and *taqwa*; some of the books written in this period have greatly enriched the literary heritage of Islam. But the learning, integrity and *taqwa* of these great figures of recent Muslim history cannot be used to defend the record and political role of the parties they founded.

The position that the Muslim Institute has taken for more than a decade is that no progress in rebuilding the House of Islam is possible within the framework of the post-colonial nation-States. The path of the *Ummah* and that of the Islamic movement within the *Ummah* is blocked by the nation-States. These nation-States are like huge boulders blown across our path by the ill-wind of recent history.

All nation-States that today occupy, enslave and exploit the lands, peoples and resources of the *Ummah* must of necessity be dismantled. It is the nation-States that give life and respectability to nationalism. Nationalism is not an idea that precedes its political manifestation. With some exceptions, the idea of nationalism has been artificially planted in order to support an externally imposed State. The idea of the State based on nationalism is so alien to the moral genius of our people that every single nation-State in the *Ummah* is unstable, weak and forever on the verge of collapse. All Muslim nation-States in the world today are maintained by a mixture of internal oppression and external support. It is only the regular injection of military and economic 'aid' from the leading imperialist powers that keeps these States going. None of these States has solved any of its own problems let alone those of its people. Since these States have neither roots in the history of Islam nor in the history of their peoples, they will not be difficult to dismantle.

While the dismantling of the existing nation-States is unlikely to present many problems, a great many conceptual and organizational problems have to be overcome. These relate to the nature and organization of the Islamic movement, to the political map of the *Ummah*, and to the political, economic and social transformation of the *Ummah* that we now seek to bring about. Let us realize that the extent, depth and nature of the change that we now seek is the most profound transformation of a world community that has ever been attempted. It is quite clear that one *Ummah* must mean one Islamic movement, leading to one global Islamic State under one Imam/Khalifa. From where we stand today, the prospect of a single global Islamic State under a single leader seems so remote that most people would regard such a goal beyond the bounds of realism. Those of us who

assert the general proposition that the unity of the *Ummah*, at all levels, is a set of achievable goals, must be more precise if we are not to be dismissed as naïve, illogical dreamers dealing in trite absurdities devoid of substance. Before we can expect to be taken seriously we must go further and insist that a rigorous system of thought based on observation and experimentation be put forward by the *ulama* and intellectuals of Islam. The Qur'ān and the Sunnah will yield greater and greater knowledge and insight as our capacity to use and absorb knowledge expands. It seems to me that Muslims, so far, have barely begun to use the total potential of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah in the shaping of a programme for the total transformation. It is probably true to say that the need for the total transformation of the *Ummah* has at no time been as obvious and as urgently felt as it is today. In the period of rapid expansion of the domains of Islam and the political and cultural dominance of Muslims, the need for such a transformation was not felt at all. The rapid physical and political expansion was itself seen as transformation. In this period, the leading scholars of Islam concentrated their attention on the writing of extensive commentaries on the Qur'ān. Their assumption appears to have been that such maladies as were found in the *Ummah* would be corrected through the better and deeper understanding of the Qur'ān. Clearly, the Qur'ān is a fathomless source of knowledge. Modern writers have pointed out that the laconic style of the Qur'ān includes profound nuances only now beginning to be understood and after man has developed the microscope, the telescope and other tools of observation and analysis in such fields as biology, astronomy, physics, chemistry and geology.[3] These new insights into the meaning of the Qur'ān will not be reflected in *tafsir* literature for some time to come. It will be some considerable time before our purely religious seminaries adjust to the scientific knowledge that enhances our understanding of the Qur'ān. The Qur'ān is of course unchanging. It has remained unchanged since its Revelation and will remain so until the end of time. But our understanding of the Qur'ān can deepen with our own understanding of the processes of history, our experiences and our ability to absorb and use new knowledge. The same is true of the Sunnah of the Prophet. The Sunnah is also a record of the total transformation of the Hejaz and its people over a period of twenty-three years. The Hejaz is a relatively small geographical area and its population, at the time of the Prophet, was also very small. The entire *Ummah* during this time lived within the territorial control of the State of Medina. Therefore, from the

Sunnah that transformed only the Hejaz we have to derive a programme for the transformation of an *Ummah* that is now global. An added complication is that the *Ummah* we want to transform is now divided into about fifty nation-States, each claiming to be 'sovereign' and 'independent' though each is, in one way or another, subservient to *kufr*.

We must not underestimate the power of the nation-States and their ruling elites to exploit the nationalist emotions of our people. Only a year ago, when I said that 'national' frontiers between Muslim countries make no sense and that they should become 'open' or 'soft' frontiers as successive nation-States are converted into Islamic States, the controlled media of the Pakistani regime immediately accused me of advocating the disappearance of Pakistan; the media of the Jama'at-e Islami, in Pakistan, accused me of 'anti-national' activities and of serving 'foreign interests'. So the boulders of nationalism and the nation-States are not lifeless, inanimate objects accidentally blown into the path of Islam; they represent the mobilized power of *nifaq* and also some well-meaning but misguided 'Islamic parties'. These obstacles in the path of Islam are all armed and supported by the power of global *kufr*. They have, also, already made it clear that they are going to fight Islam at every step and all the way. It so happens that Islam, too, orders us to fight these forces until our victory is achieved with the Help of Allah.[4] For us there is no such thing as internal conflict and external conflict. The forces inimical to Islam are so deeply rooted in the fabric of the *Ummah* that all conflicts will be simultaneously internal and external. There are no clearly defined geographical frontiers between Islam and its enemies. Those within Muslim societies who insist on accepting the political, social, cultural and economic supremacy of the west are not only our rulers, country-men and neighbours but often members of our own families. Thus, the era of conflict we have now entered into is one of grave consequences for all Muslims. No Muslim can opt out of the consequences of these conflicts. These conflicts will not leave anyone unaffected. It is not a matter of choice whether or not we want to engage in these conflicts; those opposed to Islam have already declared war on Islam. As we have seen, the greatest manifestation of this declaration of war against Islam, is the era of nationalism and of the nation-States. There can be no compromise, there can be no accommodation and there can be no peace in the world of Islam so long as any traces of nationalism remain in our societies. No programme for the transformation of the

Ummah is either realistic or even based on the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, if it does not set out to exorcise the ghost of nationalism and all its various political, social, cultural and economic manifestations.

As far as I know, the total transformation of the *Ummah* from its present condition to the ultimate condition that Islam desires has never been stated as a set of achievable goals. In the last 200 years, Muslim political thought has been, entirely, a reaction to the decline of Muslim political power and the emergence of the west as a global political power and civilization. The west's scientific, technological and economic achievements so dazzled Muslim thinkers that they accepted 'progress' as defined by the west as essential for the future of Muslim societies. Much energy was spent in trying to reconcile the essentials of this 'progress' with Islam. It was this search for reconcilia-tion between Islam and western-style 'progress' that led to attempts to admit nationalism, capitalism, democracy and latterly socialism into Islam. Such attempts are still going on with programmes of 'Islamization' that, essentially, do not alter the chosen course of 'progress' through westernization. How deeply ingrained this idea of the compatibility of Islam with the west is, is demonstrated by the support 'Islamic parties' are giving to programmes of 'Islamization' in Muslim nation-States whose rulers are both secular and subservient to the west. There are also some 'Islamicists' naïve enough to believe that the United States is a friend of Islam and a natural ally against 'godless communism'.[5]

Let us first of all realize that we cannot even begin to think about the total transformation of the *Ummah* without first taking up the position that there is no compatibility whatsoever between Islam and the west. It is only when we have taken this step that we have created the necessary spiritual, material and historical situation in which the total transformation of the *Ummah* becomes a logical necessity. In today's historical situation, the declaration of the incompatibility of the civilization of Islam with the civilization of the west is the only step that can free us from the psychological stranglehold in which the west has held us for so long. This declaration of incompatibility forces us to prove the point that we are in fact incompatible; it forces us to define our civilizational goals in terms of Islam and Islam alone; it demands that we find alternatives to such global sacred cows as capitalism, socialism and democracy; it makes it necessary for us to find our own solutions to the problems of underdevelopment, poverty

and wealth. The power of Islam in the world can be developed and mobilized only if the sources of our power are within the house of Islam. For instance, military power that depends on arms purchased either from or supplied by the west cannot be used for the glory of Islam. Standing armies of mercenary soldiers and officers will not and cannot fight for Islam. Lightly-armed *muttaqi* soldiers who go out to fight and die for Islam are more powerful than the heavily-armed professional soldiers who fear death. The mobilized will of the Muslim masses, under a *muttaqi* leadership, makes the Islamic State an invincible force. Compare this with the modern nation-States, in which the people are either divided by competing political parties led by sectional interests or where professional soldiers provide some of the most oppressive regimes of all history. In the nation-States that are the creation of the west, where ruling classes and 'Islamic parties' regard Islam as compatible with the west, the political systems are subservient to the west. The economies of these States are also integrated into the world capitalist system. The path of the *Ummah* is blocked not only by the boulders of nationalism but by the entire log-jam of western civilization. Nationalism is the very foundation of the west as we know it. It is, therefore, not possible to deal with national-ism in isolation. The road to the total transformation of the *Ummah* is a long one. We have not become so deviated from our original course in a short time and we are not going to get back to where we should have been by now overnight. When we talk about the total trans-formation of the *Ummah* we are talking about a process of history-making that will occupy us for a very considerable period of time. However, the immediate change of direction that is required must, at the very minimum, include the emergence of a global Islamic move-ment that rejects nationalism and the nation-States in their entirety and regards the west as totally incompatible with Islam.

The declaration of the incompatibility of the west with Islam brings us face to face with another question to which I have often referred in the past: the question of leadership. Once we have taken up the position of incompatibility between Islam and the west, we have also taken the position that those educated in the western tradition have no part to play in the leadership of the Islamic movement.

When I have said this in the past, many brothers have regarded it as too harsh and unrealistic. Where, they have asked, are the *ulama* who can lead the Islamic movement? This is a question that needs careful consideration.

Those who react in this way seem to think that I propose to exclude western-educated Muslims from the Islamic movement alto-gether. This is not so. I am convinced that all Muslims, whatever their background, whether educated or not, have to be part of the Islamic movement. This clearly includes those educated in western-styled schools, colleges and universities. But those educated in the western manner must realize that their education has equipped them to serve the political, social, economic, cultural, administrative and military systems that we must destroy. Western education teaches a man to be arrogant and selfish. In all Muslim societies today, we have ruling classes who have been educated and trained to dominate and exploit our countries in the style of the western colonialists. The western-educated ruling classes of today are the children, grandchildren or great-grandchildren of those who welcomed the western colonialists and co-operated with them. It is through them that our societies have been severely damaged by western colonialists. In every part of the world today there are governments and regimes controlled by this class of people. All such governments and regimes are doing every-thing possible to prevent the emergence of Islam in a political role. Throughout history, there is not a single instance of a western-educated Muslim elite that has served Islam in any meaningful way. There are of course hordes of western-educated scholars of Islam who have taken degrees in Islam just as others have taken degrees in medicine, law, economics, history and so on. Their major role, how-ever, has been apologetic. These are the 'scholars' of Islam who have been trying to write books on 'Islamic economics', 'Islamic politics', 'Islamic liberalism', and so on. These are the compromisers who have been trying to prove that Islam is compatible with their secular ambitions and western preferences. The leadership ranks of the 'Islamic parties' are full of such 'Islamizers'. In Iran, these westernized individuals and groups were given a chance to serve in the highest offices of the Islamic State. And what did they do? They tried to capture supreme power. They, in fact, tried to re-establish Iran as a liberal and democratic nation-State with a few cosmetic 'Islamic' features. But now that the nationalists, liberals, communists and *munafiqin* have been unmasked and defeated, the vast majority of the westernized elite's youth performs glorious deeds in the service of the Islamic Revolution and the new Islamic State.

A particular feature of the western-educated elite is that its members cannot see any role for themselves except that of leadership.

The fact is that they were created to lead our people during the era of our subservience to an alien power and civilization. Their leadership role was itself subject to the overall control and dominance of the west. We cannot find a single instance of a Muslim country or society having escaped the dominance of the west under the leadership of those the west itself had prepared and chosen to lead us. What we do find is that in the post-colonial period all parts of the *Ummah* have become even more subservient to the west than they were in the heyday of direct colonialism. The so-called leaders of our 'independence' and 'fathers' of our 'nations' have been some of the most slavish people the *Ummah* has ever produced. They and their successors have done the bidding of the west more than the bidding of Allah, *subhanahu wa ta'ala*. In the struggle against *kufr* that lies ahead, these men and their supporters are likely to play the political role of *kufr* and *shirk* against Islam. They will be the chief instruments of the west's war against Islam and the Islamic movement. It is not an accident that all the nation-States dividing the *Ummah* today are lined up behind Saddam Husain. Nor is it an accident that both superpowers are also on the same side.

The incompatibility between Islam and the west that we have established and the total transformation of the *Ummah* that we seek to bring about force us to seek a leadership which is also compatible with our goals. Such a leadership can only emerge from the roots of Islam itself, and not from those sections of the *Ummah* that are contaminated by alien influences. If such people, let us call them *ulama*, do not already exist, then we will have to wait until they do. However, I do not accept that such *ulama* do not exist. What is true is that most of the known figures among the *ulama* are, in one way or another, tied to the coat-tails of the secular regimes. They and their institutions are dependent on official patronage, and are, therefore, in no position to participate in a struggle that sets out to defy and destroy the prevailing order. There are other eminent figures who simply do not understand the contemporary political situation of the *Ummah* in the world at large. They have become eminent through a lifetime of service dedicated to keeping the basic beliefs and rituals of Islam generally understood in the *Ummah*. This they have achieved by choosing not to challenge the political power of *kufr*. They worked within the narrow confines of the 'religious freedom' offered by *kafir* systems. In the post-colonial era, especially in the last thirty years, some of these *ulama* and their poverty-stricken institutions have received

enormous financial patronage from the oil-rich Arab regimes. This has made them and their followers even more docile and subservient than they were in the days of direct European colonialism. Some of these *ulama*, especially in British India, opposed the leadership of the secularized, westernized Muslims but failed to offer an alternative to the dominance of *kufr*. The Muslim masses largely ignored them. The Muslim masses also ignored the 'Islamic' alternative offered by the 'Islamic parties'.

Today, the historical situation has been transformed. On the one hand, the Muslim masses in one country, led by their *ulama*, have swept aside the power of *kufr* and established an Islamic State; on the other, the post-colonial regimes in the nation-States have been unmasked and exposed as instruments of the political dominance of *kufr*. It is true that the subservient *ulama* and the 'Islamic parties' are still trying to defend the status quo, but it is also true that large numbers of both ordinary and very influential people in the *Ummah*, including many *ulama*, have become convinced that the only way forward is through a succession of Islamic Revolutions in all Muslim areas of the world. This newly invigorated opinion in the *Ummah* has yet to assert itself to challenge and defy the established political order. The irrelevance of the established 'religious' order of the subservient *ulama* and of the 'Islamic parties' has also become obvious to many people. Thus, the new global Islamic movement represents a new confidence in the *Ummah* that the west *can* be defeated, and a heightened sense of expectation and optimism for the future. The evidence of this spiritual and intellectual ferment in the *Ummah* is everywhere—in Muslim homes, families, communities, cities and countries throughout the world. This new mood cuts across all other known barriers of nationalism, ethnicity, territoriality and sectarianism. This is especially so between Muslims following the Shi'i and Sunni schools of thought. Despite the efforts now being made by the enemies of Islam to drive a wedge between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims the fact is that, in the last six years, under the influence of the Islamic Revolution, more Shi'i and Sunni Muslims have come closer together than at any other time.

Throughout the world new relationships have been forged between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims. I know of many *ulama*, of both schools of thought, who are meeting and working together in many parts of the world. Throughout the world there have emerged *ulama*, intellectuals, students and others whose names are not yet household names. We

have to remember that the world's press and media are entirely controlled by the enemies of Islam. The Islamic movement's own media is, as yet, in its infancy. Indeed, everything about the new Islamic movement is in its infancy. An entirely new phase in the history of Islam has been inaugurated. The greatest assets of the new Islamic movement are the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Islamic State that has been established in Iran, the leadership of the *ulama* of Iran and, above all, the leadership of Imam Khomeini. To follow in the footsteps of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the *Ummah* outside Iran also needs to develop a leadership that is primarily, though perhaps not exclusively, derived from the ranks of the *ulama*. The emergence of leadership is itself a complex process which we should examine in detail on some other occasion. All that we need to note here is that if the new Islamic movement sets out to achieve the total transformation of the *Ummah*, then the quality of the leadership will be determined by the nature of the struggle that is undertaken.

There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that the total transformation of the *Ummah* will require a total struggle at all levels and in all fields of human activity. Our struggle will be spiritual, philosophical, political, social, cultural, economic, scientific and military. Since we seek the total transformation of the global *Ummah*, the struggle will be conducted at all levels and at different levels in different parts of the world simultaneously. Such versatility in a global movement presents many problems. In some parts of the *Ummah*, as in Iran today, the struggle may have reached a relatively advanced stage. Indeed in Iran there is already an Islamic State in existence led by an Imam. In other parts of the *Ummah* the struggle has barely begun.

I have long held the view that once an Islamic State has been established it becomes by definition the leader of the *Ummah* and of the global Islamic movement. Every Muslim must give his allegiance to that State. In my view, this is not just a functional necessity it is a Divine ordinance. I have said before that Islam is incomplete without the Islamic State. Equally, the life of a Muslim is incomplete without allegiance to an Imam/Khalifa. I realize that Imam Khomeini has not offered himself for the general *ba'ya* of the *Ummah*. His reasons for not doing so are not difficult to understand. But this should not prevent us from regarding both the Islamic State of Iran and the Imam as leaders of the global Islamic movement. It is important to realize, however, that Iran, too, is still in the process of transformation. Perhaps, Iran is still in the early stages of transformation. At a seminar

in London more than five years ago I argued that the first Islamic State to emerge after a lapse of more than 1,300 years would be a 'primitive model' of the ideal. Clearly there are stages involved in the total transformation of the *Ummah*. The early stages of transformation in an Islamic State, established as a result of a successful Islamic Revolution, are different from the early stages in other parts of the *Ummah* that are still some years away from an Islamic Revolution.

The instrument for the total transformation of the *Ummah* can be none other than the global Islamic movement. The method of the Islamic movement is the *Seerah* of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. After a prolonged struggle, the speed of transformation is accelerated to a point at which it is referred to as an 'Islamic Revolution'. The Islamic Revolution is the stage at which the Islamic movement converts either an area or country into an Islamic State. The Islamic State is then invaded by the external enemies of Islam whilst internal enemies try to subvert it. After a prolonged struggle, the Islamic State defeats its internal and external enemies and acquires control over its immediate environment. There then follows a prolonged period of transformation of the society at all levels until a truly *muttaqi* and just society comes into being. It is now possible to state these as distinct stages in the making of history and relate them to the *Seerah* of Muhammad, upon whom be peace.

The first stage is clearly the stage of prolonged struggle against very heavy odds. In the *Seerah* this is known as the 'Makkan period'. In this stage, which lasted for thirteen of the twenty-three year prophethood of Muhammad, there were a number of distinct phases. For most of this period, the Islamic movement is small and weak and there is no reason to believe that such a fledgling band of believers can overcome the established and dominant order. The power and arrogance of the established order and the relative weakness of the Islamic movement do not persuade the Islamic movement to tone down its beliefs, ideas, methods or goals. Indeed, during this period the Islamic movement boldly declares that the established order and its belief systems are evil and must be destroyed. At this point, the Islamic movement is only a scattered body of individual Muslims who are exposed to the worst kind of oppression and torture.

In the new 'Makkan period', in which the bulk of the *Ummah* lives today, the Islamic movement has to define its position clearly, crisply and unambiguously. Our basic declaration of faith—'there is no *ilah* except Allah'—must be related to the contemporary objects of

worship that we have acquired in recent history. In the Prophet's time the declaration that 'there is no *ilah*' was understood by the Quraysh of Makkah as referring to the hundreds of idols they worshipped and kept in the Ka'aba. The Makkans also understood clearly that the declarations of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, were a direct challenge to the established system of authority and hierarchy in Makkah at the time. The new global Islamic movement of today has to make equally forthright and unambiguous declarations. For instance, we have to state categorically that the only two collective identities we recognize are those of the House of Islam and the house of *kufr*. The Muslims are one *Ummah* and the *kuffar* are one *millat*. There is no third *millat* in the world. The Muslim *Ummah* recognizes no nationality as a basis of law, statehood or sovereignty. There is no compatibility between the civilizations of Islam and *kufr*.

Once such a declaration has been made by the global Islamic movement, it also means that all the pillars of western civilization, such as social democracy, capitalism, socialism, liberalism, republicanism, marxism, anarchism, populism, multi-racialism, unionism, and so forth, are part and parcel of the *millat* of *kufr*. All these ideas, beliefs and philosophies, often dressed up as 'science' and 'progress', have been institutionalized. The highest of these institutions is the nation-State. All nation-States which exist today, including those with predominently Muslim populations, are, therefore, *ipso facto*, integral parts of the global domination that *kufr* has acquired.

No exception is possible. It must not be argued, indeed it cannot be argued, that because there is *shura* in Islam, modern democracy is 'Islamic'; that because private property is allowed by Islam, modern capitalism is 'Islamic'; that because Islam believes in equality, there is 'socialism in Islam', and so on. We have to wipe the slate clean before we can write on it; we have to demolish what exists before we can build on any site. This is the meaning of the declaration that 'there is no *ilah* except Allah'.

It was this clarity of mind and singleness of purpose that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, first induced among a handful of his followers in Makkah. Once this step had been taken, all else in the *Seerah*, the first full-scale Islamic movement, followed as day follows night. It was this single, bold, definitive, uncompromising step taken in Makkah that ultimately led to the total transformation of the Hejaz. It is this single step, when it is taken by the global Islamic movement today, that will inexorably lead to the total

transformation of the *Ummah*, indeed to the total transformation of the world.

There is one more condition to be met. The global Islamic movement cannot take the first step without a leader. This is a condition that was never met and could not be met in the days of the local, regional and national 'Islamic parties' and partial Islamic movements. In our day, there has emerged a leader who has successfully achieved the transition, in one part of the *Ummah*, from the 'Makkan period' to the establishment of an Islamic State. This transition has been achieved under the *muttaqi* leadership of the *ulama* of Iran, one of whom is their *imam*. There is no other holder of political office in the world of Islam today, no other living soul, who can possibly qualify for the leadership of the global Islamic movement. It so happens that the declaration of incompatibility between Islam and *kufr* has been the cornerstone of the Islamic movement in Iran. The ruthless and uncompromising eradication of the influence, power, control and culture of *kufr* is the most outstanding feature of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.[6]

There is a difference between the 'Makkan period' in Makkah and the 'Makkan period' of today. In Makkah under the leadership of the Prophet, when the *Ummah* was only a handful of Muslims, the meaning and commitment of the declaration that 'there is no *ilah* except Allah' was clear to the established order. Today, when the *Ummah* represents a global community of Muslims, our faith and its declaration do not carry purpose, conviction, programme and precise meaning. It is only in Iran that the Islamic movement has defined and achieved the goals of the 'Makkan period'. Today, the figure of Imam Khomeini is identified with the modern 'Makkan period'. By adopting him as the leader of the global Islamic movement we give notice that the entire *Ummah* is now prepared to wage a relentless struggle against the Muslim nation-States and against the control and dominance of *kufr* over the House of Islam. In any case, the global Islamic movement cannot be led by anyone other than the leader and religious and political head of the first Islamic State to emerge in modern times.

Another point of vital importance is that in the original 'Makkan period' the Muslim *Ummah* was not only small but also united. There were no schools of thought in Islam. Those differences which, today, exist among Muslims are a peculiar product of the course Islamic history has taken. My view is that because our history has been

divisive we are divided. Once the course of our history turns towards the pursuit and achievement of the goals of Islam that are common to Muslims, of all schools of thought, history itself will make these divisions a distant memory. The same sentiment was echoed by Imam Khomeini in a message to *hujjaj* in September, 1980. He said:

> To love one's fatherland and its people and to protect its frontiers are both quite unobjectionable, but nationalism, involving hostility to other Muslim nations, is something quite different. It is contrary to the Noble Qur'ān and the orders of the Most Noble Messenger. Nationalism, which results in the creation of enmity between Muslims and splits the ranks of the believers, is against Islam and the interests of the Muslims. It is a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are disturbed by the spread of Islam. More saddening and dangerous than nationalism is the creation of dissension between Sunnis and Shi'is and diffusion of mischievous propaganda among brother Muslims. Praise and thanks be to Allah that no difference exists in our Revolution between these two groups. All are living side by side in friendship and brotherhood. The Sunnis, who are numerous in Iran and live all over the country, have their own *ulama* and *shaykhs*; they are our brothers and equal with us, and are opposed to the attempts to create dissension that certain criminals, agents of America and Zionism, are currently engaged in. Our Sunni brothers in the Muslim world must know that the agents of the satanic superpowers do not desire the welfare of Islam and the Muslims. The Muslims must dissociate themselves from them, and pay no heed to their divisive propaganda. I extend the hand of brotherhood to all committed Muslims in the world and ask them to regard the Shi'is as cherished brothers and thereby frustrate the sinister plans of foreigners.

A little later in the same message, Imam Khomeini sends out this rousing call to the *Ummah*:

> Muslims the world over who believe in the truth of Islam, arise and gather beneath the banner of *tauhid* and the teachings of Islam. Repel the treacherous superpowers from your countries and your abundant resources. Restore the glory of Islam, and abandon your selfish disputes and differences, for you possess everything. Rely on the culture of Islam, resist imitation of the west, and stand on your own feet. Attack those intellectuals who are infatuated with the west and the east, and recover your true identity. Realize that intellectuals in the pay of foreigners have inflicted disaster upon their people and countries. As long as you remain disunited and fail to place your reliance in true Islam, you will continue to suffer what you have suffered already. We are now in an age when the masses act as the guides to the intellectuals and *are rescuing them* from abasement and humiliation. For today is the day that the masses of the people are on the move; they are the guides to those who previously sought to be the guides themselves. Know that your moral power will overcome all other powers. With a population of almost one billion and with infinite sources of wealth, you can defeat all the powers. Aid Allah's cause so that He may aid you. Great ocean of Muslims, arise and defeat the enemies of humanity. If you turn to Allah and follow the heavenly teachings, Allah, *subhanabu wa ta'ala* and His vast hosts will be with you.

The Imam is not afraid of identifying the enemies of Islam:

> The most important and painful problem confronting the subjugated nations of the world, both Muslim and non-Muslim, is the problem of America. In order to swallow up the material resources of the countries it has succeeded in dominating, America, the most powerful country in the world, will spare no effort.
>
> America is the number-one enemy of the deprived and oppressed people of the world. There is no crime America will not commit in order to maintain its political, economic, cultural and military domination of those parts of the world where it predominates. It exploits the oppressed people of the world by means of the large-scale propaganda campaigns that are co-ordinated for it by international Zionism. By means of its hidden and treacherous agents, it sucks the blood of the defenceless people as if it alone, together with its satellites, had the right to live in this world.
>
> Iran has tried to sever all its relations with this Great Satan and it is for this reason that it now finds wars imposed upon it. America has urged Iraq to spill the blood of our young men, and it has compelled the countries that are subject to its influence to boycott us economically in the hope of defeating us.

Unfortunately, most Asian countries are also hostile to us. Let the Muslim nations be aware that Iran is a country effectively at war with America, and that our martyrs—the brave young men of our army and the Revolutionary Guards—are defending Iran and the Islam we hold dear against America. Thus, it is necessary to point out, the clashes now occurring in the west of our beloved country are caused by America; every day we are forced to confront various godless and treacherous groups there. This is a result of the Islamic content of our Revolution, which has been established on the basis of true independence. Were we to compromise with America and the other superpowers, we would not suffer these misfortunes. But our nation is no longer ready to submit to humiliation and abjection; it prefers a bloody death to a life of shame. We are ready to be killed and we have made a covenant with Allah to follow the path of our leader, the Lord of the Martyrs.

O Muslims who are now sitting next to the House of Allah, engaged in prayer: pray for those who are resisting America and the other superpowers, and understand that we are not fighting against Iraq. The people of Iraq support our Islamic Revolution; our quarrel is with America, and it is America whose hand can be seen emerging from the sleeve of the Iraqi government. Insha'Allah, our struggle will continue until we have achieved real independence, for, as I have said repeatedly, we are warriors, and for Muslims surrender has no meaning.[7]

When that message was issued on September 13, 1980, the Iraqi regime had not yet launched its full-scale invasion of Khuzistan; Imam Khomeini's references were to skirmishes on the border that had been going on for some weeks. Now the imposed war is nearly five years old. The most significant point about this war is that, for the first time since the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, both the United States and the Soviet Union are on the same side. The two superpowers, both belonging to the house of *kufr*, want to make the world believe that their goals are so diametrically opposed that they must continue to arm themselves with the deadliest weapons either to deter or defeat each other. However, their common hatred of Islam is such that they have openly united in the war against Islam. They know that the house of *kufr* must unite in order to confront and defeat the challenge of Islam to the western civilization. At the same

time these superpowers and their allies and friends—Israel, India, Japan, South Africa and the regimes in the Muslim nation-States—have also realized that they must prevent the Muslim *Ummah* from becoming united against them. They know that once the *Ummah* is even partially mobilized in a global Islamic movement it will become invincible. They have already experienced the power of Islam in Iran. For Muslims the unity of the *Ummah* is an article of faith and a functional necessity for the 'Makkan period' of the Islamic movement. The differences among the various schools of thought in Islam are insignificant compared with the issues that divide capitalism and communism. If the house of *kufr* can ignore its differences in order to confront Islam, can the House of Islam not sink its differences to defeat that house of *kufr*? For Muslims the unity of the *Ummah* does not require anyone to abandon his particular position.

However, we should acknowledge that there are major obstructions to the expression of this unity in the *Ummah*. The political, economic, social and cultural obstructions to the expression of the unity of the *Ummah* are enormous. The greatest of these obstructions is nationalism and the nation-States. There are also other powerful forces at work to keep the *Ummah* divided, weak and subservient. The major objective of the Islamic movement is to mobilize the masses under *muttaqi* leaders in all parts of the world. This goal will be achieved at different times in different parts of the *Ummah*. As it is achieved, those areas will be liberated from nationalism and the dominance of the west. New Islamic States will be established in the newly liberated parts of the *Ummah* until, one day, the entire *Ummah* will consist of Islamic States united in a hierarchy of institutions under a single Imam/Khalifa. This is perhaps looking too far ahead. At the same time, perhaps it is important that we should look as far ahead as possible. Clearly the new leadership of the *Ummah*, as it takes shape, will have to engage in a prolonged process of *ijtihad* to resolve the many new issues that will undoubtedly arise.

In the new global Islamic movement that we now have, there is one part that has successfully completed the transition to an Islamic State and there are those parts that still find themselves at the earliest stages of what we have called the 'Makkan period'. Thus the entire spectrum of the *Seerah* of the Prophet, upon whom be peace, is simultaneously relevant to the entire modern Islamic movement. The *Seerah* is the blueprint for the Islamic movement in all stages. The *Seerah* literature that is found today is almost entirely devoted to the

recording of events that took place 1,400 years ago in more or less the same order. There is as yet little or no attempt to derive from the *Seerah* a programme for the total transformation of the *Ummah* in today's conditions. This is because the *ulama* of today and their institutions have not been part of an Islamic movement committed to the transformation of the *Ummah*. The only commitment of the *ulama* has been to study the original texts, to lead the Muslim communities in prayer and to help them perform religious rituals. The new global Islamic movement will motivate a new generation of *ulama*. Only those *ulama* who are actively engaged in the struggle will be able to derive from the *Seerah* a programme for the total transformation of the *Ummah*. *Ijtihad* will, henceforth, be a continuous dynamic process prompted and guided by issues that will emerge in the course of the struggle. In the meantime, it is possible to create a functional and operational unity in the global Islamic movement by reference to the original 'Makkan period'. The emergence of such a functional and operational unity of the *Ummah* in a global Islamic movement raises issues that cannot be dealt with here.[8]

It has been said before, and needs to be said again, that the goal of the total transformation of the *Ummah* presupposes a total struggle. In the space of this paper it has not been possible for me to proceed to the detailed description of the total struggle and its various stages that lie ahead. I have dealt only with the outline of the first stage of the total struggle. There is, however, one aspect of it that requires a brief treatment.

It is this. An important part of the method of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, was to acquire control over the environment around him. It is well known, for instance, that the Prophet always sought out the visitors to Makkah who went there either as traders or as pilgrims. He invited these *outsiders* to Islam hoping to create followers of Islam outside Makkah. The Quraysh of Makkah took this threat so seriously that they tried to prevent visitors to Makkah from coming into contact with the Prophet. The Prophet also used the larger environment to seek protection for the early Muslims. This is the significance of the migration of Muslims to Abyssinia. They were given refuge by the Christian King there. The Makkan Quraysh sent a delegation to the King asking for the Muslims to be turned over to them. The King of Abyssinia, after hearing the Muslims' case, presented to him by Ja'far ibn Abi Talib, rejected the embassy of the Quraysh. Many Muslims lived in Abyssinia until the migration of the Prophet to

Medinah. Thus, in the earliest days of Islam, the Prophet secured a sanctuary for the Muslims outside Makkah. The Prophet also travelled among the tribes around Makkah. The best known of these travels is the Prophet's trip to Ta'if. It was this ceaseless struggle to acquire a foothold outside Makkah that led to the two pacts of al-Aqabah, which ultimately led to the Prophet's migration to Medinah and the setting up of the Islamic State there. Having brought the greater part of the environment of Makkah under his control, the Prophet embarked upon the conquest of Makkah.

For the 'Makkan period' of the new Islamic movement today the lessons are clear. The Islamic movement recognizes no frontiers in the *Ummah*. The struggle for the liberation of any one part of the *Ummah* can be carried out from any other part of the *Ummah*. Every part of the *Ummah* is a potential asset for all other parts. This means that every obstacle in the path of the Islamic movement in one part of the *Ummah* is also an obstacle for the entire Islamic movement. Every Muslim engaged in the struggle in any part of the world, no matter how remote or isolated, is engaged in a global struggle. Every group that is engaged in the struggle, no matter how small or remote, is also part of the global struggle between Islam and *kufr*.

We have to eradicate all traces of nationalism from the Islamic movement before we can challenge and defeat the power of nationalism established in territorial nation-States and a worldwide international system dominated by the mobilized power and resources of the enemies of Islam. Ultimately, the shape of the *Ummah* will be determined by the shape taken by the Islamic movement today.

Notes

1. See my paper *Integration and Disintegration in the Politics of Islam and Kufr*, presented at the World Seminar on State and Politics in Islam in London in 1983. It is available in English, Arabic and Farsi.
2. This paper was presented at the World Conference on Muslim Education held in Makkah, April 1977. It was published by The Open Press, London, in 1980.
3. For example, see Maurice Bucaille's interesting book, *The Bible, the Qur'ān and Science*, Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1978.
4. Qur'ān al 2: 208; 3: 142; 8: 74; 9: 16; etc.
5. Ismail Faruqi in *Arabia*, London, June 1982, p. 36.
6. See my paper, 'Primary Goals and Achievements of the Islamic Revolution in Iran', presented at a world seminar in London in August 1984. The paper is included in Kalim Siddiqui (ed), *Issues in The Islamic Movement*, London. The Open Press, 1985.
7. Extract from Imam Khomenini's message taken from Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, Berkeley. Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 302–6.
8. At the Muslim Institute we have pursued the goal of a functional and operational unity of the Islamic movement for the last fourteen years. See, for instance, the *Draft Prospectus* of the Muslim Institute (1974), and my two short books, *Towards a New Destiny*, 1974 and *The Islamic Movement: A Systems Approach*, 1976 both published by The Open Press Ltd.

Chapter II

Nationalism in the Light of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah
Murtaza Garia

Nationalism in its modern form is a product of colonialism. It had, however, its origin in the self-defence mechanism built up in Europe, particularly in western Europe, to defend itself against the overbearing authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and the struggle was initially carried out by Protestant elements within the Christian community. It drew its strength from the emotional reaction which is always at work in situations of external and alien pressures upon local residents. The 'outside' enemy could always galvanize the masses into resistance and eventually into liberation movements. The concept of nationalism was, therefore, at its inception, a development in the drive of people to free themselves from alien domination and foreign exploitation.

Nationalism was in the course of time destined to outgrow its role as a unifying element in the struggle against foreign powers. In the era of colonization, which gained additional momentum from the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nationalism was used as an instrument of deliberate policy for subjugating peoples in different parts of the world. Whatever the reasons might have been for appropriating peoples' lands (economic, military, political or for settlement purposes), the colonization process always resulted in the division of the world into masters on the one hand and slaves on the other. The masters, who shared among themselves different portions of the divided world, were at the centre and the slaves at the periphery. The latter's role was essentially one of 'doing what the masters bid'. They could do little else, since they were cowed down by the masters' might which, perforce, had to be right.

The colonization process was able to make much headway because, apart from the unprecedented scientific and industrial progress

which had been taking place in Europe, military supremacy, which, hitherto, had been in Muslim hands, had suffered a serious blow at the hands of Europe. In 1774, the Ottoman Empire was defeated by Russia, setting the stage for further conquests in terms of political, economic and cultural penetration. Soon, wide tracts of Muslim lands came under foreign domination. Among these were Morocco, Algiers, Egypt and Turkestan.

Military defeat was, none the less, only one aspect of the general overthrow of Muslims. The main factor contributing to their downfall was their progressive relaxation and gradual abandonment of the teachings of the Qur'ān which had historically been the mainstay of Islamic civilization and had led Muslims to world leadership. However, moral laxity, the temptations of ease and luxury, internal strife and dissensions, hairsplitting arguments among the *ulama*, all soon worked their way into the social fabric of Islam and wrought untold havoc among Muslims, resulting in their decline.

The first signs of the eventual collapse of the Muslim *Ummah* can be traced back to the period immediately following the reign of the four Rightly-guided Caliphs, when there began to be a cleavage between the political and religious in the religio-political order of Islam. Prior to this period, there had not been undue attention paid to worldly considerations. These were, in decisive moments, altogether discarded in favour of Allah's will, even at the cost of one's life. Such unwavering determination and unswerving allegiance to the cause of Allah had been the rock on which the ships of worldly temptation had foundered. But afterwards the situation underwent considerable changes at the hands of those who sought the comforts of this life and who relegated salvation to a secondary position, being preoccupied all the time with the temporal exercise of authority and power. Even some of the *ulama* of the time were ready to pander to the whims and caprices of these leaders, seeking their favours. Gradually, the hold of religion weakened, the Muslim community lay exposed to foreign penetration and un-Islamic tendencies wormed their way into the mainstream of Muslim life, with all the attendant evil consequences. Western Europe was mainly instrumental in bringing about the plight in which Muslims find themselves to this day.

Europe had at the time embarked upon a crass materialist policy, following its own struggle with the Church and the latter's defeat because of its hostility to the forces of reason and science. The

Church had all along adhered to untenable dogma and the clergy had become intellectually bankrupt. Moreover, the phase of the inquisition had alienated enlightened sections of the people who had begun to frown upon the Church's role as the fountainhead of morality, truth and knowledge.[1] However, the period which followed the expulsion of the Church from the arena of public life saw the gradual descent of Europe into the pit of materialism. Having broken loose from the authority of the Church, the next and logical step was to outlaw the Supreme Being from having any say in human affairs, in the name of science and the scientific spirit.[2]

This materialistic temperament was not given its fullest expression until all links with the Church had been severed.[3]

Once such a policy was agreed, there was nothing to prevent Europe going on the rampage to serve its own interests. The weaknesses of the Muslims only made the Europeans task much easier, since there was no effective resistance. The Muslims were in large part, thus, responsible for their own downfall.

With its military superiority, Europe could go further with its plan of conquest, subjugation and exploitation of foreign peoples. Europe was, however, wise enough to realize that it would not be able to hold on for long on the basis of military supremacy alone. Knowing from bitter experience that a resurgent Islam could still sound the death-knell of its dominance, it began a de-Islamization process, in the Islamic world, through the separation of religion from the State. In this endeavour, it was joined by other powers with the same intention, that is Islam was the common enemy and it had to be made impotent.

In order to achieve their design more efficiently, they enlisted the support of the elites of the local Muslims and used them as their clients. While paying lip service to Islam, these local elites are today ruling Muslim countries but the truth is that they are still in the grip of their masters. Otherwise, how can we explain the complete disarray in the present Muslim world; with one Muslim cutting the throat of another; with famine threatening the lives of millions of Muslims throughout the world; with illiteracy stunting the growth of Muslim countries; with Muslims in a state of dependence on others for their needs and aspirations in virtually all walks of life; in brief with the Muslim *Ummah* at the lowest rung of the ladder of nations with the other nations looking down upon it with contempt?

Though foreign domination has taken many guises in its historical development, from military superiority to technological supremacy, going through political, economic, social and educational phases, the underlying idea that has always been at work is the 'divide and rule' principle. This principle is nowhere more evident than in the Islamic world. The principle found expression in many ways, but we shall deal with just one manifestation—nationalism—which has been a source of untold misery to the Muslim world and which, in its modern meaning, has no grounding at all in Islam, indeed is totally alien to its teachings.

The first form of human association has historically been the family, with blood relations and heredity as its foundation. These biological characteristics provided the primary basis for love, co-operation, mutual support and protection against outside threats, when necessary. Relationships fostered by these characteristics are not only natural but find favour with Allah, who says in the Qur'ān:

> And among His signs is this, that He Created for you mates from among yourselves, that ye may dwell in tranquility with them, and He has put love and mercy between your (hearts); verily in that are signs for those who reflect (30: 21).[4]

These biological characteristics cannot be altered, though members of the family may live far away from each other and may not nowadays exhibit the degree of homogoneity normally expected of a traditional family.

At the second level of social organization, there is the tribe, which has in the course of time been extended to mean the nation, with biology, geography and politics as its anchors. The biological base relates to physical characteristics, for example, the colour of the skin, shape of the eyes, nose and mouth *etc.* which are inseperable from the individual. These too, are, however, Divinely ordained and are not subject to the individual's choice. Besides, these do not invariably extend to all members of the tribe or nation, though they are frequently true of the family. Therefore, it is a false claim to define nationalism in terms of biological factors.

With regard to the geographical base, natural boundaries such as rivers and mountains have determined the territorial limits of nations. This too is a false claim, as being born in a particular place constitutes no basis for defining a person, let alone for evaluating him. Moreover, with increasing possibilities for movement from one

place to another (there have been massive migrations throughout history), living in a particular territory does not provide a sound basis for defining a nation let alone using such a basis for the practice of a policy of ethnocentrism, a value which is accorded the highest priority under nationalism.

There remains the political base. This finds concrete expression in the determination of a people to be a nation, with full autonomy of will and action, apart from all others. In this case, the pursuit of the nation's goals and objectives constitutes the supreme good even if in the process it becomes necessary to suppress the legitimate rights of others to be a nation as well. In this way, the most oppressive injustices have been perpetrated against other peoples and the foulest means have been used to further the nation's aspirations, irrespective of the costs involved in terms of human lives and values. Today, the world is groaning under the weight of nationalism, which has been presented to the ruling classes of different nations beautifully gift-wrapped. Little do these ruling classes realize or, if they do, they do not care that, in accepting this gift, they are only playing into the hands of the enemy, becoming mere pawns through which their lands and people are exploited for their enemy's benefit and prosperity. On the other hand, the enemy has taken good care to perpetuate his hold by amply providing for the ruling local elites and by coming to their rescue at decisive moments. History abounds with such examples of external interferences when the situation at the local level threatens the interests of the foreign powers. The local elites, it must be remembered, have had their training and education in countries which have taken good care that they return home as 'authentic' nationalists to operate by proxy for their masters. This long distance operation is especially tragic for Muslim countries, among which artificial barriers have been erected to prevent them from fusing into one single Islamic *Ummah*, as their religion commands them.[5]

Nationalism as a political weapon has, therefore, been used to make people self-centred and thus better able to continue the exploitation and pillage of the world's resources for the welfare of the few to the detriment of the many. The feelings engendered by nationalism and patriotism take root so deeply in the minds of people that they are ready to lay down their lives in defence of it. If only the people would look behind the curtain or lift the veil, nationalism would stand unmasked in its true hideous colours. For,

the national interest which these elites claim to serve is in fact their own group interest.

The Islamic concept of State differs fundamentally from the secular one in that while the latter perceives itself as a centre to which the rest of the world is only a means for its own progress and welfare, the former is an administrative unit for the efficient translation of the Divine will into practice. While the nation-State is the be-all and end-all of social action and has no higher values and motives than its own desires and impulses, the Islamic State has a mission to fulfill: to carry the Divine message to the four corners of the world, in ever-widening concentric circles, so as to make the Law of the Creator reign supreme over other systems of Statecraft.

Islam neither denies the existence of nations nor is it inimical to the practice of nationhood as a basis for social identification and differentiation, for this is Allah's pattern of creation; but it does deny the nation's ultimacy in the determination and conduct of affairs. The Qur'ān says:

> O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of male and a female and made you into nations and tribes that ye may know eachother. Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you (49: 13).

It is, therefore, clear that nationalism cuts at the very roots of humanity and ascribes partiality to Allah in His dealings with His creatures. It is also evident that the underlying ideas behind classifying humankind into tribes and nations are complementarity and co-operation, and that these do not provide yardsticks for establishing one's worth, for honour in the sight of Allah transcends membership of a particular tribe or nation, being based on righteousness (taqwa).

Nationalism, thus, violates the very essence of Qur'ānic teaching, which goes against ethnocentricity, promotes universalism, embraces all aspects of life, advocates a free society and inculcates a brotherly spirit among members of the Islamic faith.

Islam regards all mankind as one nation. The Qur'ān says:

> Mankind was one single nation, and God sent Messengers with glad tidings and warnings; and with them He sent the book with truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they

differed; but the People of the Book, after the clear signs came to them, did not differ among themselves except through selfish contumacy (2: 213).

This unity of mankind is only natural in that all men stand in equal relationship with Allah and His creatures and it would be invidious of Allah to discriminate among His creatures on the basis of criteria other than His own, which relate to universal values rather than to considerations of race, language, territory and the like. Otherwise, His justice and transcendence would be in serious jeopardy. Partiality and favouritism are human traits and cannot be ascribed to the ultimate source of being.[6]

The God of Islam is not a spent god who has outlived his usefulness and has now left the immediate and ultimate in life in the hands of the living, but is Ever-living and watching man in his discharge of the Divine trust placed upon him with a view to actualizing the Divine will on earth in default of which man will eventually have to render his account.

The Islamic State cannot become a vehicle of sin because there will always be, in the Muslim's consciousness, the idea of personal responsibility and final answerability for his actions. This is not to say that people will not commit sin. It is simply stating that sin will not permeate through the entire fabric of social life because the Divine commandment to Muslims to 'enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong' and the Muslims' care to remain within the limits of halal and haram, if only at the individual level. This is, moreover not a theoretical vindication of the virtues of Islam but is empirically verifiable by comparative studies on the impact of different religions on the lives of their adherents.

The universal character of Islam is evident from the very first verse of the Qur'ān, which proclaims Allah as Lord of the worlds (1: 2). The Deity of Islam is not for the Muslim alone, nor is He limited in space and time. Nor does anybody, in relation to Him, have to shoulder more or less responsibility than others in carrying out His will. All are equal before Him in their creatureliness. All have equal claim on His love and mercy. All are subject to His laws of reward and punishment.

It has been said earlier that honour in the sight of Allah is based on righteousness. The Qur'ān says about righteousness:

It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces towards east or west; but it is righteousness—to believe in God and the Last Day and the Angels and the Book and the Messengers; to spend of your substance, out of Love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayer, and practise regular charity; to fulfil the contracts which ye have made; and to be firm and patient, in pain (or suffering) and adversity, and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth, the God-fearing (2: 177).

This verse is at the same time a unique declaration of universal human duties, virtues, faith and practice and a negation of formalism, or externalities, in the determination of a person's worth.

Nor does Islam's universalism envisage an exclusively Muslim world community, or aim to bring the whole world under its sway by force; for it is proclaimed unequivocally: 'Let there be no compulsion in religion: truth stands out clear from error' (2: 256).

While exhorting its adherents to exert themselves for the establishment of the Divine order on earth, it makes it possible for such an order to be achieved through different channels and provides specific injunctions concerning the dealings of Muslims with other communities. These should be conducted on the basis of justice and love. The Qur'ān says:

O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for God can best protect both. Follow not the lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort (justice) or decline to do justice, verily God is well-acquainted with all that ye do (4: 135).

Lest feelings of hate lead Muslims to commit excesses, the Qur'ān commands:

O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for God, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear God (5: 9).

While Judaism considers Christianity as an extension of itself and Christianity considers Islam as a non-religion, religion having been concluded with the coming of Jesus, on earth and his redemption of humanity through his atonement for our sins, Islam regards both Judaism and Christianity as it regards itself, i.e. as divinely revealed. It is an article of Islamic faith to believe in the revealed books and prophets. The Qur'ān says:

The Apostle believeth in what hath been revealed to him from his Lord, as do the men of faith. Each one (of them) believeth in God, His angels, His books, and His Apostles. 'We make no distinction (they say) between one and the other of His apostles!' And they say 'We hear and we obey: (we seek) Thy forgiveness, Our Lord, and to Thee is the end of all journeys.' (2: 285).

The revealed book of Islam, the Qur'ān, is not a book for Muslims alone but is a reminder to all men that Allah's message to humanity has been the same throughout the ages. Speaking to the Prophet of Islam, upon whom be peace, about religion, the Qur'ān says:

The same religion has He established for you as that which He enjoined on Noah—that which We have sent by inspiration to thee—and that which we enjoined on Abraham, Moses, and Jesus: namely, that ye should remain steadfast in religion, and make no divisions therein (42: 13);

again,

Nothing is said to thee that was not said to the apostles before thee (41: 43);

and yet again,

Verily this is no less than a message to (all) the worlds (with profit) to whosoever among you wills to go straight (81: 27–28).

Islam is, thus, against nationalism and particularism. It calls upon its followers to aspire to a world community under its banner, not on the basis of violence and compulsion but through free acceptance. The Muslim is entitled only to the freedom to call and convince others of the truth.[7]

When Muslims were leaders of the world, adherents of other religions prospered side by side as separate *ummahs*, bringing about the

kingdom of God on earth, on the basis of common moral principles. The ideal of world community found its greatest affirmation in Islam, and its greatest embodiment in the Islamic State.[8] Such a State guarantees the freedom to differ not only to the different *ummahs* under its umbrella as collectivities but also to the individual members of each *ummah* as well, since the Qur'ān addresses men in general.

The last sermon of the Prophet of Islam, upon whom be peace, gave the final blow to all discriminations based on ethnic, racial and geographical considerations when he admonished his audience in the following terms:

> Listen to me well, O people; God created you all descendants of Adam, and Adam He created of earth. No Arab has a priority over a non-Arab, no white over a black and no non-Arab over an Arab, or a black over a white, except in righteousness.

This complete levelling of human beings does not preclude differentiation on the basis of knowledge, faith and righteousness and so forth. All of these, however, relate to achievement, either individual or collective, and have nothing to do with ascriptive norms and values.

The Qur'ān does not admit any dichotomy between politics and religion, faith and reason, spiritual and material, theory and practice, and so on. Further, it does not regard any area of human activity as falling outside its purview, whether it be economic, social, political, cultural or whatever. It regulates all aspects of life and prescribes a complete code for living which does not need to borrow from outside of itself for its continued existence and progress. The purpose of man's creation is accordingly the execution of the Divine will. The State as a political institution is, thus, the 'executive' agency for the achievement of Allah's design in accordance with His laws and the State may not operate independently of such laws. Since the ultimate legislator is Allah, it follows that all that men do, as His vice-gerents, has to accord with and be subject to His laws.

The spiritual and material are not separate in Islam but are given their due importance in the Qur'ān, which says:

> But seek, with the (wealth) which God has bestowed on thee, the home of the hereafter, nor forget thy portion in this world: but do thou good as God has been good to thee (28: 77).

The material goods at the command of men are means whereby men may attain felicity; they are neither to be deprecated nor disdained. The spiritual may not be pursued at the expense of the material nor the material at the expense of the spiritual.

The aim of Islam, it will be seen, is to invest the individual with an integrated and well-balanced personality, imbued with high moral principles and caring for the well-being of everyone around him while at the same time tending towards self-fulfilment. This is quite the opposite of the objective of nationalism which turns people into egocentric, ethnocentric self-seekers who will not be held back in the pursuit of their own interests, whatever the cost to others.

Islam's view of life as a whole finds expression in its teachings, which cover all aspects of life both at the individual level and at the collective level. Its coverage extends to all areas of human activity be it economic, social, political, educational etc.; all undertakings are to be carried out with a view to bettering the lot of mankind generally and in accordance with the Divine pattern. In everything that one does there is to be service to Allah on the one hand and to the love of humanity on the other; this love is also to be extended to other creatures of Allah. There should be no despoliation of nature but, on the contrary, judicious use of its bounties. All human interventions in space and time must have for their objective the realization of the Divine Will.

Islam accordingly sets out broad principles which should govern the life of man on earth. However, since this life is preparatory to a life in the Hereafter, the Qur'ān teaches that man, in his various dealings in the world, should always bear in mind their ultimate implications.

It has been shown that nationalism violates Qur'ānic teachings and, therefore, has no place in Islam. The practice of nationalism, however, has also proved to be a failure both on the domestic level of nation-States and at the international level. On the domestic front, nationalism conceals glaring contradictions within the nation-States themselves because the nation is everywhere a conglomeration of diverse groups striving for diverse ends, often conflicting with each other. Common race, language, territory have not prevented these various groups from fighting, and killing, each other. The 'interiorization' and 'internalization' of parochial values have moved progressively from the national to the regional and thence to the local and family levels. All these groups try to safeguard their own selfish interests.

At the international level, the feelings of nationalism have always been impervious to any attempt at universalism: witness the debates at the United Nations meetings where all issues of universal import are finally narrowed down to serving vested interests. Further, in all international agencies, the same concern prevails and any openness shown to others is inspired and motivated by egoistic considerations. There is not a single forum that is not used as lever for the furtherance of one's own cause, in utter disregard of others' rights.

The main reasons for the continued practice of nationalism among Muslim States seems to stem from a crisis of identity and a lack of effective leadership among the *Ummah* generally, and among the ruling elites in particular. The latter have become so impregnated with western values that it has become practically impossible for them to visualize the broader perspective of Islam. They suffer from all the stresses and strains of a split personality, with the result that their view about Islam is defective. Many genuinely believe that western and Islamic values may be reconciled. They are thus unable to provide the type of leadership which is necessary for the *Ummah* to reclaim its lost identity and function as an organic whole. Their judgement has become blurred.[9]

The love of God, above all other precepts, is the supra-national value which must be inculcated again in the minds of Muslims in order to achieve 'ummatic' dimension. The Qur'ān says:

> Verily, this Brotherhood of yours is a single Brotherhood and I am your Lord: therefore serve Me (and no other) (21: 92).

Notes

1. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, *Islam and the World*, Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, Lucknow, 1973, pp. 127–129.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 133–135.
3. Muhammad Asad, *Islam at the Crossroads*, Dar Al-Andalus, Gibraltar, 1982, pp. 38–39.
4. Abdullah Yousuf Ali, Translation and Commentary, *The Glorious Kur'an*, The Islamic Call Society, Tripoli, 1973.
5. Masih Muhajeri, *Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nations*, Tehran, 1982, p. 17.
6. Ismail Raji Al Faruqi, *Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and life*, International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) Publication, Wycote, Pennsylvania, USA, 1982, p. 127.
7. Mahmud Awan, *Trialogue of the Abrahamic Faiths Book*, IIIT Publications, Wycote, Pennsylvania, 1982, pp. 82–83.
8. Ismail Raji Al Faruqi *ibid.*, p. 58.
9. Said Ramadan, *Islam and Nationalism*, Crescent Publication, Silver Spring, MD, n.d., p. 2.

Chapter III

A Criticism of the Idea of Arab Nationalism
Mohamed Yehia

Arab nationalist propaganda has been aired increasingly in recent months from many organs in Arab countries, particularly Egypt. It is evident to observers of the Islamic movement that the rejuvenation of the concept of 'Arab nationalism' is underway as part of the current building of defensive strategies in the Arab region against the danger of Islamic 'fundamentalism'. It is appropriate that an idea that originated from the minds of Christian Levantine writers in order to serve as a weapon of disintegration against the Uthmaniyyah State should now be resurrected to serve once more against Islam.

In its latest incarnation, Arab nationalism is put to a different use from its employment by either Nasser or the Baʿathists as a means of masking personal or party ambitions. It is presented as a secular political creed that draws upon certain western concepts, such as 'nationalism' itself, for its frame of reference. These concepts, modernity, progress, socialism, among others, represent both its slogans of attraction and the intellectual criteria by which it views Arab reality.

The leading feature of the renewed nationalist propaganda is the emphasis on 'Arab' as opposed to 'Islamic'. The aim of this change is to substitute the former for the latter as an inclusive and fundamental point of departure for analysis, description, and thought about political and social facts. The limited 'Arab horizon' is designed to replace and take precedence over the Islamic horizon in the thoughts and feelings of those at whom the nationalist propaganda is directed. The insistence on 'Arabness' as an alternative to 'Islamicness' gives the entire game away. It is clear that in recent presentations of the idea of Arab nationalism a confrontation with Islam is intended. Advocates of Arab nationalism do not hide the fact that they attack

Islam but their use of the concept as a weapon of attack—the anti-Islamic climate now prevailing in many Arab countries—is hindered by the fact that its presentations are riddled with logical contradictions. This is what I intend to expose.

The idea of Arab nationalism suffers from two main contradictions. The first is the exclusion of Islam as a defining and constitutive element of that nationalism. The second is the completely westernized content of an avowedly 'Arab' movement that supposedly wants to revive 'Arab' values and culture.

The First Contradiction

The Arab nationalist message seems simple and consistent. The Arabs from the Gulf to the Atlantic are one people united by the ties of blood, history, language and common interest. They ought to be united in one political entity which is socially and culturally modern. This programme can be achieved by the Arab nationalists in the face of opposition from various forces, of which the Islamic movement is the most prominent.

Now, the appeal to blood ties and the argument from ethnography and race has largely fallen into disrepute. Still, it is not quite clear how we can speak of a pure Arab race after the long process of mingling between the original Arabs of the Peninsula and such peoples as the Egyptians, Mesopotamians, Berbers and Negroes. The Arabic phrase 'ties of blood' comes in conveniently to cover for the weakness in the nationalist view on this matter by its double reference to both race and kinship. The latter is usually the meaning that is immediately suggested by normal usage and it saves the nationalists from becoming involved in an ethnographic debate they would lose.

The invocation of geography does not advance the nationalist argument far. The Gulf-Atlantic axis is a rather arbitrary projection which overlooks other areas to which the original Arabs ventured. The crucial fact in this regard is that it was Islam that created this 'grand Arab homeland', as it is called, and which impelled the original Arabs to conquer that area and much more beyond it so as to spread the teachings of Islam.

The Arab nationalists perform a sleight-of-hand when they arbitrarily carve out of the grand Islamic homeland (which was made

possible by the spread of the Arabs' religion) a smaller area—the 'Arab homeland'—which is then separated from the larger body and either made to stand against it or to take priority of allegiance vis-à-vis the rest of it. If, for the sake of argument, we adopt the same secularist stance as the nationalists adhere to, we can say that Islam is an Arab cultural and social phenomenon which has been propagated by the Arabs throughout a large part of the known world. In this sense, the Muslims of the world can be said to have been 'arabized' by the mere fact of their embracing Islam.

The Arab nationalists play the trick of separating a section of the 'arabized'—the Muslims—which happen to possess one added feature of 'arabism'—the language—and place it as an independent entity and identity against the rest of the Muslims. They do not include in their nationalism some Arabic-speaking minorities and ignore the vital role that Arabic, with its script, plays in the languages and culture of other Muslims.

The Arab nationalists may be indicted of contradiction according to their own secular view of Islam as a social growth. For, if it is 'the religion of the Arabs' as well as main motive for issuing out of their limited homeland in Arabia, it should be the defining feature of Arab nationalism. It is Islam, and not those cultural factors transformed by it beyond recognition, such as language or history, that should be the yardstick of Arab nationalism. Yet the nationalists are out-and-out secularists who either exclude Islam altogether or assign to it a servile position within their own creed as a vaguely defined 'spiritual factor': a servility negated by Islam's own claims.

This same criticism applies to the nationalists' call and talk about joint interests—presumably economic—as a unifying factor of the Arabs. Their definition is ambiguous. Why should common interests, of whatever sort, not exist among the Muslims, as they have always done? Once again we meet with the same trick: the arbitrary extrapolation of a certain section, within the general Islamic context, and its establishment as an independent entity. The keyword here is 'arbitrary'. Nationalism is stripped of any rational claim and its bare ideological bias, which it tries to mask either with pleas of modernity or by appeal to similar specious terms, exposed.

The major contradiction in Arab nationalist thinking that I have tried to sketch above is seen most flagrantly in the adoption of certain cultural elements, e.g. language, common history and heritage, and traditions as defining features of that nationalism while

continuing at the same time to ignore Islam out of a deep-seated secular outlook.

Before Islam, the Arabs lived in what may be called their pre-history. They were a tribal, warring collection of peoples with various dialects and with little or no cultural life, especially on the intellectual plane. Islam introduced such an unimaginable qualitative change into the life of the Arabs that it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that it 'created' the Arab identity.

The Quraysh dialect of the Arabic language was raised into the richest language in the world and one of the most widely used. Islam won for itself adherents that came from non-Arab cultures and was responsible for turning itself into a tool of thought and expression in many fields of science and scholarship. In this way, Arabic, spread far beyond its original home and speakers.

Similarly, Arab society was totally transformed in its structure, customs, aims, and outlooks. Islam has been the constitutive principle of Arab social and intellectual life for the last fourteen centuries and the attempt to posit an 'Arab nationalism' either without Islam or in confrontation with it is inconceivable. At the same time, an Arab nationalism that tries to take account of Islam will find itself in an impossible position; for the universal claims of Islam and its insistence on full allegiance to its tenets, as well as on its priority over other attachments, ensure that it rejects nationalism as a modern form of ancient tribalism and as the *hamiyyat al—jahiliyya* (fanatical clinging to pre-Islamic outlooks).

The Arabic language and culture have been made by and contained within Islam, and not the reverse. Islam has not been a passing and limited stage in an otherwise independent and developed tradition of Arab culture and society that had its own line of growth. The same applies to Arab history, which, along with the history of the many peoples that accepted Islam, is Islamic history. In fact, Islam is the common denominator that ties the life and history of a great mass of humanity together. As a universal moral code, Islam shaped every facet of the societies that embraced it, and linked them together in a vast entity which often found political expression in the *khilafat* system. A non-clerical creed, Islam does not have, for instance, a separate, isolated history as a Church.

Arab nationalists, however, take certain cultural, social, and historical facts or elements and cite them as factors of Arab

nationalism. They, therefore, ignore the decisive role played by Islam in the shaping of these elements.

Islam is deliberately banished from the Arab nationalists' considerations. It is excluded according to the principles of secularism. The cultural, social and historical facts forged by Islam are taken away from it and made to stand as supports and features of Arab nationalism. Moreover, the same facts, which can in all validity and legitimacy be adduced to substantiate the idea of Islamic 'nationalism' and identity, are arbitrarily 'stolen' from the Islamic framework and forced to become constituents of a secular idea that sets aside one group of Muslims—the so-called Arabs—and puts them above and at odds with the rest of the Muslims, who still share with this separated group the same cultural, social and historical elements of unity. This serves to enhance that artificially defined, extrapolated view of an 'Arab' identity from within the Islamic matrix. In their much-vaunted slogans about the unity of culture, heritage, customs, feeling, outlooks and hopes, the Arab nationalists use fruits from the trees of Islam while disowning the tree. This position, paradoxically enough, is their only logical move. For to recognize the claims and priority of Islam would be to deny their own existence, their own attempt to break Muslim ranks, and to establish a higher authority than religion. The Arab nationalists have to deny Islam, even at the cost of devastating logical inconsistencies; accepting Islam demolishes their own *raison d'être*. Islam neither permits a higher nor another locus of allegiance of authority and guidance; it cannot tolerate a breach of unity among the believers or a limitation of its universal message and validity. By rejecting nationalism, therefore, it is in turn rejected by it.

The Second Contradiction

The phrase 'Arab nationalism' sets up a certain expectation which is violently contradicted by the content of the idea carrying that name. It is reasonable to expect that such an idea will seek its content from peculiarly Arab intellectual and cultural sources, whatever these may be. Yet, the plain fact is that apart from some superficial slogans about the glory of the Arabs, for instance, the entire content of this idea is of western origin; from the very source referred to in nationalist rhetoric as the 'imperialist west'.

It is not a question of borrowing certain ideas and terms. It is, rather, a matter of the wholesale adoption, assimilation and 'internalization' of attitudes, frames of reference, *etc.* Arab nationalism is, indeed, a western phenomenon not just in the familiar sense of being induced by European sources but in the sense that it is merely an extension of western concerns and modes of thinking. It should, however, be added that presentations of Arab nationalism rarely, if ever, reach the degree of sophistication that would seem to be suggested here. Arab nationalism remains a crude rehearsal of certain set formulas designed primarily for mass consumption.

The major western 'import' is the principle of secularism, which Arab nationalists go out of their way to emphasize as their defining factor. Secularism is not an Islamic idea and it has not always been present in conjunction with nationalist thought in Europe itself. One thinks, for instance, of the role played by Protestantism in west European nationalism and that played by Eastern Orthodoxy in Serbian and Bulgarian nationalism. The insistence of Arab nationalists on an indissoluble bond between secularism and nationalism highlights their premeditated intentions against Islam. Secularism has been cultivated deliberately by the Arab nationalists, although it does not spring naturally from any 'Arab' source.

Secularism is only the first of many western intellectual goods appropriated by the 'purist' Arab nationalists. The most outstanding of these is the idea of nationalism itself, not as the recognition of the existence of tribes, races and peoples, but as a call for the establishment of a secular political entity around a vaguely defined nation which, in the event, turns out as often as not to be those people governed by a central authority that sets out to legitimize and mask its hegemony by fostering the 'national' myth of a glorious past and a unique identity with a future-oriented mission.

Thus a phenomenon that was deeply embedded in local European conditions, and which often came to validate certain power interests, is imported by the Arab nationalists or, rather, deliberately exported by the west to the Muslim world after being removed from its distinctive historical matrix and is transformed into an abstract, prescriptive programme. According to this formula certain entities are to be created and certain existing power interests are to be encouraged to repeat the European experiments and developments. With regard to this last point, one thinks of the attribution, after the fact, of nationalist tendencies to some rulers in the Muslim world in the nineteenth

century who sought independence from the Uthmaniyyah State. Mere power-seeking was responsible for such famous 'nationalist' examples as Muhammed Ali's rule in Egypt.

Arab nationalists usually forget that European nationalism dealt with individual entities or 'people' within the larger European framework. Applied to Arab conditions, this justifies the division of the so-called 'Arab world' into such constituent nationalisms as the Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Sudanese, and so on. This logical, 'nationalist' move is, however, rejected by Arab nationalists, who choose, for no apparent reason, to halt the division of the Muslim world at the 'Arab' frontier rather than carry the application of the nationalist principle to the legitimate level of a single people.

The secret behind this arbitrary halting is that their real concern is not the nationalist principle as such but rather its employment as a tool to destroy the larger Islamic unity. It is a good tactic to hide the disintegrative aims of that tool by pretending that it is still a unity-seeking idea—that is among the 'Arab peoples'.

It is clear that the Arab nationalists, both old and new, have not even been faithful to the principle of nationalism which they borrowed from Europe to plant in an Islamic environment. Secularism and nationalism comprise the outer frame that determines the various other loans of the Arab nationalists from the west. Having rejected Islam and posed themselves as the champions of a certain cause, they found themselves obliged to fill the vacuum and make good their claims by a programme of action or a 'project'. Upon inspection, this project turns out, in its various presentations, to be no more than a weaker version of the dominant western ideologies, also removed from their social matrix and imposed as abstract rules of action on the totally different Arab environment.

The strange variable content of Arab nationalism has passed through the entire gamut of western ideologies, from liberal, fascist, socialist, quasi-marxist and social-democrat. It has a tendency to be coloured by the ideology of the particular western power that happens to be dominant in the Middle East at a certain time or that which patronizes the Arab nationalist factions.

The western ideologies which came into being in response to certain social, political, and cultural conditions in Europe were adopted by Arab nationalist propagandists and presented uncritically as a 'project' for the renaissance of the 'Arab nation' that, according to their theory, was passing through a different path of

It is not a question of borrowing certain ideas and terms. It is, rather, a matter of the wholesale adoption, assimilation and 'internalization' of attitudes, frames of reference, *etc.* Arab nationalism is, indeed, a western phenomenon not just in the familiar sense of being induced by European sources but in the sense that it is merely an extension of western concerns and modes of thinking. It should, however, be added that presentations of Arab nationalism rarely, if ever, reach the degree of sophistication that would seem to be suggested here. Arab nationalism remains a crude rehearsal of certain set formulas designed primarily for mass consumption.

The major western 'import' is the principle of secularism, which Arab nationalists go out of their way to emphasize as their defining factor. Secularism is not an Islamic idea and it has not always been present in conjunction with nationalist thought in Europe itself. One thinks, for instance, of the role played by Protestantism in west European nationalism and that played by Eastern Orthodoxy in Serbian and Bulgarian nationalism. The insistence of Arab nationalists on an indissoluble bond between secularism and nationalism highlights their premeditated intentions against Islam. Secularism has been cultivated deliberately by the Arab nationalists, although it does not spring naturally from any 'Arab' source.

Secularism is only the first of many western intellectual goods appropriated by the 'purist' Arab nationalists. The most outstanding of these is the idea of nationalism itself, not as the recognition of the existence of tribes, races and peoples, but as a call for the establishment of a secular political entity around a vaguely defined nation which, in the event, turns out as often as not to be those people governed by a central authority that sets out to legitimize and mask its hegemony by fostering the 'national' myth of a glorious past and a unique identity with a future-oriented mission.

Thus a phenomenon that was deeply embedded in local European conditions, and which often came to validate certain power interests, is imported by the Arab nationalists or, rather, deliberately exported by the west to the Muslim world after being removed from its distinctive historical matrix and is transformed into an abstract, prescriptive programme. According to this formula certain entities are to be created and certain existing power interests are to be encouraged to repeat the European experiments and developments. With regard to this last point, one thinks of the attribution, after the fact, of nationalist tendencies to some rulers in the Muslim world in the nineteenth

century who sought independence from the Uthmaniyyah State. Mere power-seeking was responsible for such famous 'nationalist' examples as Muhammed Ali's rule in Egypt.

Arab nationalists usually forget that European nationalism dealt with individual entities or 'people' within the larger European framework. Applied to Arab conditions, this justifies the division of the so-called 'Arab world' into such constituent nationalisms as the Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Sudanese, and so on. This logical, 'nationalist' move is, however, rejected by Arab nationalists, who choose, for no apparent reason, to halt the division of the Muslim world at the 'Arab' frontier rather than carry the application of the nationalist principle to the legitimate level of a single people.

The secret behind this arbitrary halting is that their real concern is not the nationalist principle as such but rather its employment as a tool to destroy the larger Islamic unity. It is a good tactic to hide the disintegrative aims of that tool by pretending that it is still a unity-seeking idea—that is among the 'Arab peoples'.

It is clear that the Arab nationalists, both old and new, have not even been faithful to the principle of nationalism which they borrowed from Europe to plant in an Islamic environment. Secularism and nationalism comprise the outer frame that determines the various other loans of the Arab nationalists from the west. Having rejected Islam and posed themselves as the champions of a certain cause, they found themselves obliged to fill the vacuum and make good their claims by a programme of action or a 'project'. Upon inspection, this project turns out, in its various presentations, to be no more than a weaker version of the dominant western ideologies, also removed from their social matrix and imposed as abstract rules of action on the totally different Arab environment.

The strange variable content of Arab nationalism has passed through the entire gamut of western ideologies, from liberal, fascist, socialist, quasi-marxist and social-democrat. It has a tendency to be coloured by the ideology of the particular western power that happens to be dominant in the Middle East at a certain time or that which patronizes the Arab nationalist factions.

The western ideologies which came into being in response to certain social, political, and cultural conditions in Europe were adopted by Arab nationalist propagandists and presented uncritically as a 'project' for the renaissance of the 'Arab nation' that, according to their theory, was passing through a different path of

development and which had not yet attained a stage comparable to that of the European Renaissance. Yet, apart from superficial modifications to suit political conditions and guard against charges of westernization, the Arab nationalists kept the main body of the ideologies they imported intact.

Not only were the western ideologies appropriated in the manner outlined above but their peculiar terms and methods of examining facts were also adopted wholesale. This attitude is seen most clearly in that Arab nationalists see Islam, for instance, with European eyes. In fact, Islam and all other aspects of Arab reality are defined, examined, reinterpreted, and judged in terms of one western ideology or another. Favourite ideologies for this purpose have been the secular-liberal, a diluted form of Marxism referred to as Arab socialism, and a collection of socio-political ideas of American origin. Thus, Islam is usually seen by Arab nationalist writings either as a socio-economic projection from a certain 'base', a flowering of the enlightened emancipatory spirit of the Arab nation or as a 'human revolution' against the reactionary and exploitative forces of Quraysh.

Our purpose here is not to study what Arab nationalism has adopted from the west; it is rather to expose its major contradictions. With its present content and terms, 'Arab nationalism' is neither Arab nor nationalist. Rather, it is western and *inter*nationalist. It is simply a tool for propagating and universalizing western ideologies. The terms 'Arab' and 'nationalist' are convenient masks facilitating the acceptance of surreptitiously disguised western concepts among the Muslims.

Arab nationalism is not condemned here for failing to adopt the general heritage of the Arabs (the Muslims). Nevertheless, a continuation and renewal of Arab heritage in all fields of life is certainly the natural attitude to expect from those who base their ideas on Arabism and build a huge emotional aura around that term, making it the centre of their propaganda. Instead, they have abandoned the Arab heritage altogether and opted for a westernized content for their idea.

The Arab (Islamic) heritage offers a viable wealth of major premises, concepts and so forth for anyone who wishes to undertake a revival project for the 'Arab nation', even if he has reservations about what may be called the purely 'religious' part of that corpus. Islamic jurisprudence, social and moral values, principles of government, and practical experience in running a flourishing civilization for

many centuries are valid and fruitful bases that can be developed, modified, and enriched even by a secularly-bound Arab nationalism to yield a genuinely Arab project for renaissance.

Yet the Arab (Islamic) heritage is completely neglected by Arab nationalists, except for occasional mentions in propaganda, in favour of the western doctrines they pose as renaissance guidelines. The only explanation that can be advanced for this attitude is the inherent anti-Islamic nature of the idea of Arab nationalism and its essential alienness to the Islamic heritage and beliefs of the Arabs. Arab nationalism cannot envisage an Arab renaissance from within the Arabs' creed simply because that creed happens to be Islam and because adherents of nationalism have defined themselves from the outset against that religion and for the west.

Consequent Contradictions

The two major contradictions in the idea of Arab nationalism render this doctrine vacuous and negate its claims both to being Arab and to being nationalist, revealing its nature as an ideological tool for the spread of western influence. These two contradictions have been reflected in many of the positions and arguments of Arab nationalism, graphically illustrating its inadequacy.

I now propose to deal with several of these consequent inconsistencies, beginning with an examination of three positions adopted by the Arab nationalists, and concluding with a refutation of three of their most frequently repeated arguments.

Three Arab Nationalist Positions

The Attitude Towards Independence

Arab nationalist writings place a high value on their 'independence'. This was their battle-cry against the Uthmaniyyah State and has also been raised against the occupying powers in Arab countries. They even raise it against advocates of Islam, whom they accuse of hankering after the days of the 'Ottoman yoke' and of scheming to dissolve the cherished Arab independence in a universal Islamic State.

Arab nationalist definitions of independence are negative in that they regard it as freedom from external domination and influence. Independence does not have a positive content in that doctrine and this is understandable in the light of its use as an instrument of attack upon the Islamic *khilafat*. It is independence from something but with no alternative. It is not impelled by a desire to install Islam, for instance, in its place of the departing foreign influence.

Moreover, Arab nationalists have always defined independence superficially. It was first defined in exclusively political terms as the evacuation of foreign armies, to be replaced by native-rule. Later, other elements were added, such as non-alignment; the highest ceiling that these definitions have reached of late, and only in response to the west's debates on the matter, has been to make some noises about economic independence. Independence in worldview, values, attitudes, and ideologies is seldom, if ever, broached in Arab nationalist circles. These circles, that have been created by western thought, even in their way of seeing things, cannot be expected to push their cherished slogans to their logical conclusion and to their only meaningful usage.

The cause of this muddle is in the 'first contradiction' discussed above. As doctrinaire secularists, the Arab nationalists have rejected Islam as the only possible content of and justification for the call for independence. They chose to fill their creed with a thoroughly western content, while they also had to maintain the 'independence' slogan both as a *raison d'être* and as an element of attraction. This left them in such a position that they were forced to use only the negative, superficial meaning of 'independence' and to avoid its deeper implications, which inevitably suggest that Islam is the only true source of independence for the Arabs.

Arab nationalist positions on this issue are reflected in the practice of those who ruled under the banner of this idea, for example, Nasser or the Baʿathists. Their jealously advocated slogans did not prevent them from losing their independence to certain western powers—including the Soviet Union. At the same time the 'nationalist' intellectuals who call themselves 'Arab' are slavishly dependent on the cultural goods of the west. Arab nationalism has failed miserably both in theory and in practice to live up to the slogan which it made its essence. The rejection of Islam and the adoption of secularism have been responsible for this.

The Position On Palestine

Arab nationalists have recently coined a phrase to the effect that Palestine is 'the central cause of the Arab people'. Their propaganda is intended to portray them as the sole defenders of the Palestinian cause. I do not wish to dwell here on the sad and disastrous record of that 'championship'. Their intellectual failure in this slogan is perhaps more instructive. The establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine is unanimously explained by Arab nationalists as an imperialist plot against the Arab nation designed to retard Arab unity and to fritter away Arab resources. This explanation fails to account for many aspects of the question.

Arab nationalists cannot explain why the attempts to establish Israel started whilst Palestine was still a part of the Uthmaniyyah State. Instead, it is Sultan Abdul-Hamid's rebuttal of these attempts that explains much of the encouragement given to the idea of Arab nationalism by anti-*khilafat*, foreign powers at the time. There was no 'Arab nation' at that time to justify the fiendish imperialist plot but there was, rather, an 'Islamic nation' to be torn to pieces by colonial and Zionist schemes, in which Arab nationalism itself featured prominently. More importantly, they cannot explain, let alone come to grips with, the religious nature of that Jewish nationalism which has been planted by their secular western mentors in Palestine. They have been taught by the west that nationalism is built on material and cultural ties that do not include religion. This principle was shattered to pieces before the uncomprehending eyes of the Arab nationalists as they confronted the Israeli case. For here material considerations, such as unity of race and original homeland, did not ostensibly exist and the Jewish religion is supposedly the constitutive element of the Israeli 'nationalism'.

The only response that the Arab nationalists could bring to this situation was to invent a famous dichotomy distinguishing the 'Jewish' from the 'Zionist'. Judaism, it was maintained, is a religion which the secular nationalists respect. Zionism, however, is an imperialist movement, within Judaism, which should be fought in Palestine as the enemy of the Arab people.

The massive support of Jews all over the world for Israel gave the lie to this argument and, in spite of the waning of the Zionist trend inside Israel as time wore on, the State itself grew stronger. The Zionists were not the only party to share in the building of Israel;

socialists, communists and religious parties have enthusiastically joined in this process. The charge of imperialism directed against Israel and its backers rang hollow with the Arabs who saw the Soviet Union and the world communists as well as European leftists, who are the forces of good according to nationalist propaganda, supporting the new State wholeheartedly.

Arab nationalists cannot explain why the imperialists chose to perpetuate their influence in the religion through a Jewish State in the religiously significant Palestine rather than through military bases, client rulers and elites. Nor can they explain why Israel was set up at a time when the imperialist powers were already entrenched in the Arab areas that really mattered to them—the Gulf and the Maghrib. Finally, they fail to account for the fact that Israel was, and is, willing to live with all forms of secular, nationalist regimes in the area but not with an Islamic regime.

The establishment of Israel can only be understood fully in the light of designs harboured by the west on the Muslims of the Middle East. The seizure of a land holy to the Muslims (Jerusalem, al-Khalil) is an affront to Islam, and the establishment of a Jewish entity described as 'nationalist' was to provide a westernizing instrument and an encouraging example for the secular nationalism being fostered around Palestine since the beginning of this century. Israel is a phase in the long struggle between Islam and Judaism; if it serves any imperialist purpose it is in the context of the west's attack on Islam, not because of an Arab nationalism that did not exist when Israel was first conceived and that itself shares the anti-Islamic nature of that Jewish State.

It is no wonder that the Arab nationalists, who themselves were part of the strategy of confronting Islam, should fail to explain the nature of Israel, although it is allegedly their chief enemy. Both Israel and Arab nationalism have been tools in the attempt to disintegrate Islam. But the two tools are so different that the theoretical bases of the first demolish those of the second and the second stands in bewilderment before the first. Ironically enough, it is Islam that is the cause of this paradox. Religion is allowed as a basis of Jewish nationalism, but is unnaturally excluded from Arab nationalism.

The nationalists' confusion in this connection is reflected in the scandalous failures with which they met their management of the conflict with Israel, although they have been in control of the strongest Arab countries. Having excluded the Islamic dimension of

the conflict, they found themselves thrown back on appealing to the 'nationalist' sentiments of the Arab masses. But the only sentiments that came out into the open were the 'local' nationalist tendencies that were far from enthusiastic about abandoning their own homelands to defend that of the Palestinians. The real sentiments of solidarity that impelled the Arab masses to support the struggle for Palestine were Islamic. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, was the only group in Egypt to fight in Palestine against the Jews, and Islamic motives led the Egyptian people to sympathize with the *jihad*.

Arab nationalists refused to draw upon the huge material and moral resources of the Muslim world in their conflict with Israel. This would have entailed forfeiting their secular principles and brought about the very disaster their western backers fear: an Islamic unity and a new *khilafat*.

The Position Towards Islam

Various indications have already been given as to the nature of Arab nationalists writings towards Islam. Islam's claims to the exclusive allegiance of Muslims are rejected. All aspects of Islam that contradict the secular outlook, such as the Shari'ah, the concepts of *jihad* and the Islamic State, are interpreted away as mere historical growths that were attached to the body of Islam in 'ages of backwardness'. Calls for Islamic unity are condemned as dangerous deviations from the nationalist path. Islam itself is subjected to various 'interpretations' (*i.e.* distortions) to prove that it really approves of nationalism. In the process, Islam is turned into what the nationalists call *turath* (heritage). This *turath* they regard as a cumbersome corpus of writings, beliefs, attitudes, *etc.*, which has no place either in the 'modern world' or in the project of Arab nationalism unless it be 'sifted', 'purified' and 'reinterpreted'. From what point of view the *turath* will be sifted, by whom, for what purpose, under what conditions, and what will be left of it are questions that the nationalists prefer to ignore.

The attitude of Arab nationalism to Islam can be summed up by saying that an intellectual violence is exercised on all aspects of Islam to make it amenable to their secular views and to justify its exclusion from any place of prominence in Arabs' lives. This is all done in favour of nationalism, but once more the nationalists fall into contradiction. The natural course would have been for them, first, to either find Islam inadequate or empty of content and then to set about building a

social and political creed to replace it. On the contrary, the strategy of Arab nationalism was to attack the fullness and validity of Islam and to deny and throw doubt on its programmes so that it could justify its own project and doctrine.

This attitude towards Islam reveals itself in yet another contradiction. Arab nationalists have shown intense concern in preventing the Arab entity they carved out of the body of Islam from reuniting with that body. All political movements that call for even lukewarm and formal co-operation between Muslim nation-States are scoffed at for being reactionary and hindering the crystallization of the desired Arab entity.

However, the nationalists do not have any reservations about either linking or even incorporating that precious Arab entity into other international entities and movements, not only in the political but in the cultural and economic spheres as well. The majority speak in the current revival of their thought about a unified front of all the 'progressive' forces of the world. Other Arab nationalists speak of close ties between the Arab entity and western Europe as a cultural and political body that balances the two 'superpowers'. Some of these speak more specifically about a 'Mediterranean' entity which fuses the Arabs and the southern Europeans into a primarily cultural-economic system. This last variety is flagrantly anti-Arab in its implications of merging the Arab identity into an essentially western culture.

On the political front, the Arab nationalists envisage merging their cherished entity into such world movements as the Non-Aligned, the 'Third World' and the 'South'. These movements are really western-defined and inspired, despite their high-sounding rhetoric about imperialism, a just economic order, and so forth. The point I am trying to make is that while the Arab nationalists have no difficulty in co-operating with or even merging into internationalist movements of any other kind, they stand completely against any form of Islamic action, even if it were mere window-dressing.

Once again, Arab nationalism presents us with a contradiction that can only be explained by its anti-Islamic stance.

Three Arguments of Arab Nationalism

Arab nationalism is not a well-argued or defined doctrine, as has already become clear. It's advocates usually have a limited repertoire of

arguments that derive their only strength from being tirelessly repeated, uncritically circulated as self-evident truths. These arguments are weak and reveal the contradictions we have examined. I now propose to round off my criticism of Arab nationalism by discussing three such frequently advanced arguments.

The Argument Of 'National Unity'

The star argument of the Arab nationalists is that their doctrine will solve the problems of the non-Muslim minorities in Arab countries by abolishing the principle of religious rule (by the Muslim majority) and replacing it with nationalist rule, in which the higher authority will be secular and under which the minorities will regain their 'rights'.

There are no religious minorities in the 'Arab world' except the Copts in Egypt, who have been assimilated into the Muslim majority in all walks of life, and the Christians and some deviant sects in the Levant. The latter have been hostile to Islam for centuries and have cultivated, in modern times, close ties with the imperialist powers and Christendom. It was from among such groups that the concept of Arab nationalism emerged to serve as an instrument of attack upon the *khilafat* and to separate the Arab countries from the rule of Islam—thereby making them an easy prey for the European imperialists and their clients, the westernized elites.

In the light of the confinement of disaffected minorities to a narrow corner of the Arab world, the primacy given to this issue by Arab nationalism raises doubts about this movement. It has very wide claims and it declares its intention to replace Islam as the guiding 'project' of the Arabs. When the major justification given to these bold claims turns out to be the solution of a minority problem that only exists in the minds of some members of the minorities concerned, suspicion is naturally aroused.

Religious minorities in the Arab world did not suffer from persecution under Islam or the Uthmaniyyah State. They attained a secure and advanced status that made them ambitious for more, particularly with the penetration of European influences into the Ottoman-ruled Arab provinces. The Maronites in Lebanon used their links with France to agitate against the Uthmaniyyah State, calling for an independent Christian-dominated enclave in the Lebanon which was realized almost a century later. This agitation against Islam's tolerant rule was motivated, primarily by religious sentiments and was

coupled with enthusiastic entry into alliances with such colonial powers as the French and the British in the nineteenth century. There was no talk, at first, about either an Arab dimension or 'nationalism' to this minority plotting an insurrection.

The 'Arab' dimension was suddenly introduced into the context to serve both as a cover for these moves towards minority secession and as a skillful tool to engage Arab Muslims in a struggle against Islam and its rule. For 'Arab' is a critical and sensitive term. It has been so indissolubly tied to Islam as almost to become synonymous with it. At the same time, it does not clearly indicate Islam and may be filled with non-Islamic, if not anti-Islamic, content—by reference to the pre-Islamic age, for instance. In this way, it can be used for deception and propaganda purposes with the first meaning displayed and the second either implied or intended. This is how it came to serve the conspiring minorities of the Levant by disguising their far from 'nationalist' ties to the west. It dragged with it the idea of nationalism, with its secular essence, as a further aid in disguise and in luring the unsuspecting Arabs from their allegiance to Islam.

This basically religious agitation against Islam and its rule is exposed fully in the insistence of Arab nationalism on the argument of 'national unity'. It explains why a movement that is supposedly secular and engrossed in a 'project' for the renaissance of the Arabs should pay such exaggerated attention to an imaginary problem that does not arise in Islam either theoretically or in practice; and that, if it arose, could easily find a solution within Islam's tolerant precepts. This argument only reveals that the main concern of the Arab nationalists is to continue the plan of the Levantine minorities, namely independence from Islam and ties with the west instead.

It is ironic that the Arab nationalists, who ask the Muslim majority to shed their allegiance to Islamic teachings on unity and to Islam's priority in and authority over their lives, come also with a call for more commitment from the non-Muslims to their own creeds. They completely ignore the fact that their alleged championship of the numerically small minorities comes at the expense of the overwhelming majority of Muslims whom they address. This is because their definition of minority rights is entirely negative. These rights will be secured only against Islam, when Islamic rule has been abolished and the Muslims have been secularized and westernized. In fact, these last few words point to the paradox involved in the Arab nationalist view. The rights of the minorities will be guaranteed and their problems solved only

when the majority of Muslim Arabs have become like the Christians of Europe; that is, like the Christian minorities in the Arab world.

The nationalists who are so concerned about minority rights make no attempt either to find them within Islam or to work for them under its rule. They do not even care to define these rights and problems except in the negative sense described above. Thus Arab nationalism poses itself, primarily, as the solution to certain undefined problems of some small minorities at the expense of the Muslim majority. The proposed nationalist entity which has so far failed to solve the minority problems, witness the renewed sectarian tensions in some Arab countries, will also create other problems. It will clash with the strongly entrenched local nationalisms in many Arab countries, it will come into conflict with racial and linguistic minorities in these countries, and it will clash with universally-oriented movements such as Islam.

The grand scheme of Arab nationalism boils down to a suspicious obsession with a so-called minority problem, the solution to which will create a host of other problems, foremost among which is the obliteration of the identity of the Arab Muslim majority in practice. These problems have actually been created and Arab nationalism has, in that sphere, proved itself merely a tool for achieving the hegemony of religious and political minorities.

In Syria, it was the Christians and then the Alawites who used Arab nationalism as a cover to disguise their personal power-seeking, which ended in tragedy for the Muslim majority. In Iraq, it is the secularist-Christian minority that rules under the banner of Arab nationalism and leads the Muslim people of their country to attack the Muslims of Iran. In Lebanon, the Christians raised the same nationalist slogans, only to drop them and uncover their real designs and alliances with the enemies of Arabs and Muslims alike.

The Argument of 'Modernity'

There is a constellation of words that are always present in Arab nationalist propaganda and which are produced as arguments in favour of this idea. These words include 'modernity', 'progress', 'the age', 'reason', 'enlightenment', and similar phrases that supposedly support the Arab nationalist doctrine against its Islamic opponents, who are usually described by a counter vocabulary like 'reactionary', 'backward', barbaric, uncivilized, and so forth.

It is obvious that mere repetition of a group of terms does not, in itself, constitute an argument but that it has, rather, only a propaganda value. However, when these words are used in Arab nationalist writings they usually carry a westernized content of a leftist character. This is more evidence of the essentially dependent nature of a doctrine that brags about its 'Arabness' and 'independence'. Modernity, in nationalist usage, means establishing a society similar to that of the west and progress is measured with reference to that model. Enlightenment and reason mean thinking and behaving in the secular, materialist modes of Europe.

Islamic thought has come in recent years to analyze and criticize the arsenal of favourable terms circulated by the Arab nationalists and, indeed, by all sections of the secularist spectrum. It is usually pointed out that these terms are relative and abstract and must be placed in a certain frame of reference when used. However, it can easily be demonstrated that, even in the context of the western content of the Arab nationalists' terms, nationalism cannot be described either as modern or enlightened. Nationalism of the kind that prevailed in Europe since the Renaissance has been superseded by 'the modern age'. An 'enlightened' and 'progressive' socialism or marxism thinks in global terms and defines man in universal material terms that are basically socio-economic and neither racial nor cultural. A new 'nationalism' has been created in the Soviet Union that cuts across old nationalistic lines and unites and merges people on the basis of an internationalist creed.

The same can be said of the United States, where a new 'nationalism', perhaps it could better be called identity, is created through the famous 'melting-pot'. It is basically a cross-national entity built round a peculiar secularist ideology: 'the American dream'. There is also the example of Israel, which is supported by 'enlightened progressives' the world over. All these entities, and others in China and Australia for instance, build nations on the basis of certain ideologies that are essentially religion-surrogates. The building of nationalism on racial, ethnographic bases is not the mode of the 'age' in the leading powers of the world.

The enlightened and rational secular ideas or attitudes that the Arab nationalists display are usually hackneyed remnants of nineteenth century positivist-materialist thought which are now dead museum-pieces. It is certainly neither rational nor enlightened to present vague emotional echoes mixed with outmoded racial thoughts as the basis for Arab nationalism.

Arab nationalists usually argue that they are working in the spirit of the age to create a larger entity out of local nationalisms in the Middle East area, just as is now being attempted in Europe through various 'unions'. This, however, does not hide the fact that their call is essentially disintegrative and not unifying. To unite some local nationalisms, a task in which Arab nationalists have failed miserably, is surely a paltry thing compared to the serious schism which Arab nationalism has caused in the Muslim world, with the help of non-Arab chauvinism. In fact, Arab nationalism has a chronic tendency to degenerate into local nationalisms.

The Argument of 'Practicality'

With the weakness of their ideas being felt more and more, the Arab nationalists have developed this argument in the face of criticism from Islamic quarters. Islam is seen by them as an unfit alternative to nationalism. Its civilization failed many centuries ago and its political expression, the *khilafat*, is gone for ever after displaying its inherent defects. Moreover, Islam does not really have anything to offer beyond some general moral tenets. The social and political spheres are thus open before an Arab nationalism that offers a practical alternative.

It is tempting to quash this argument by appeal to the practical record of Arab nationalist forces that have ruled most Arab countries for differing periods throughout the last thirty years or more. They have ruled in dictatorial fashion, liquidating all other political tendencies and singling out the Islamic for particular harshness in order to prevent the evolving of a credible Islamic movement and, hence, a viable alternative to their rule. However, their failures in the social, economic and political fields have been resounding. All of the famous 'socialist experiments' introduced by the Arab nationalist regimes and elites have ended in ruin and their political and military efforts have been unable either to unify the Arabs or to confront Israel.

Arab nationalist regimes led by military, intellectual and sectarian elites of secularist and westernized preferences have practised dictatorship at its worst, strangling all sorts of liberties and human rights. They have enforced western ideas and values on Islamic societies, thereby causing chaos and deterioration. Their much-vaunted development schemes have mostly been ill-conceived and badly planned, as well as incompetently and corruptly managed.

In contrast, one can point to many practical successes of Islamic rule throughout history, though the comparison would be unjust to Islam because the Arab nationalists have such power in their hands as not even the most despotic Muslim ruler could have dreamt of. It may be more to the point to refer to the contemporary success of Islamic movements on many social and intellectual levels, even when they have been subjected to severe persecution and the distortion of their ideas and goals. The case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and that of the Islamic societies in recent years may be considered in this connection.

Arab nationalism is in a worse condition, in the estimation of viability, than that it thinks Islam is in. If we grant that both movements currently exhibit signs of failure and weakness, Islam has to its credit the fact that it has been forcefully excluded from the sphere of action in its own countries for more than a century by repeated colonialist and nationalist attacks. Islam is viable as a living creed which shapes the believers' values and view of life; it is not a travesty of certain nineteenth-century European ideas that have outlived their interest there. The argument from practicality is reduced, in fact, to the contention by Arab nationalists that since their elites are in possession of power and influence, their idea is more practicable than Islam, which has been excluded, by them, from the sphere of action.

They consider that the wider and deeper Islamic ideas, which go beyond race and view man in his entirety, are impracticable. They reject the comprehensive Islamic 'project', whose features they consistently distort by their secularist approaches, and present a limited, racially based, vaguely defined, and practically disproved idea as a viable alternative to it for no other reason than that they happen to be in or near power and that they resent an Islamic change.

Conclusion

This chapter has set itself the rather narrow task of criticizing what it described as logical inconsistencies bedevilling the current, and old, presentations of the concepts of Arab nationalism. It suggests that these contradictions, which affect the positions and arguments, can be explained by the fact that Arab nationalism has been envisaged from

the beginning not as an intellectual creed or philosophy but rather as a political instrument to achieve certain ends; i.e. the arousal of some eastern Arab provinces against the Uthmaniyyah State. These ends have later developed to include the secularization and covert westernization of the Middle East Muslim Arabs, the pushing of non-Muslim or anti-Islamic elites into positions of influence and power, the legitimation of leadership ambitions, either by certain dictators or by Arab nationalist parties, and the establishing of an 'Arab' entity that is separate from the Islamic entity and made to stand against it after using some of the elements it created.

Arab nationalism was primarily conceived for an emotional, demagogic mode of propaganda and dissemination: hence the contradictions. The Arab crowds, it seems, could be sufficiently aroused by a jumble of slogans. Arab nationalism, that is, started life with a derogatory veiw of the Arab mentality.

When Arab nationalism began to feel the need for intellectual development, it could only magnify the contradictions inherent in itself in the way that I have traced. With its overwhelming western content Arab nationalism has, in fact, lost its independence and become a mere branch of some ideologies of the west but minus the intellectual sophistications. As I have earlier emphasized, it has practically ceased to be 'Arab' or 'nationalist' and has turned into a Trojan horse for internationalist forces encroaching upon the Muslim world. It combines with other secularized and westernized nationalisms fostered in various areas across the Muslim world to yield a pattern of attack upon the unity of that world and its identity.

The various brands of nationalism use the unification elements created by Islam to promote their own claims of independent and separate entities vis-à-vis Islam. They disintegrate the universal Islamic identity but they do not, as might be expected, end up in several entities. Rather, they are reunited again into another global system, that of western civilization in its widest sense. The nationalisms are claimed as smaller but more valid entities than the larger identity of Islam; but they soon reveal their essentially *dependent* westernized nature and merge into the universal western system in any or all of its political, economic, and cultural manifestations.

The crucial point in this development is the two contradictions that I isolated. The nationalisms represent intermediate stages in the confrontation between Islam and the west. They are seccessions from Islam which claim an independent identity but their essential content

In contrast, one can point to many practical successes of Islamic rule throughout history, though the comparison would be unjust to Islam because the Arab nationalists have such power in their hands as not even the most despotic Muslim ruler could have dreamt of. It may be more to the point to refer to the contemporary success of Islamic movements on many social and intellectual levels, even when they have been subjected to severe persecution and the distortion of their ideas and goals. The case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and that of the Islamic societies in recent years may be considered in this connection.

Arab nationalism is in a worse condition, in the estimation of viability, than that it thinks Islam is in. If we grant that both movements currently exhibit signs of failure and weakness, Islam has to its credit the fact that it has been forcefully excluded from the sphere of action in its own countries for more than a century by repeated colonialist and nationalist attacks. Islam is viable as a living creed which shapes the believers' values and view of life; it is not a travesty of certain nineteenth-century European ideas that have outlived their interest there. The argument from practicality is reduced, in fact, to the contention by Arab nationalists that since their elites are in possession of power and influence, their idea is more practicable than Islam, which has been excluded, by them, from the sphere of action.

They consider that the wider and deeper Islamic ideas, which go beyond race and view man in his entirety, are impracticable. They reject the comprehensive Islamic 'project', whose features they consistently distort by their secularist approaches, and present a limited, racially based, vaguely defined, and practically disproved idea as a viable alternative to it for no other reason than that they happen to be in or near power and that they resent an Islamic change.

Conclusion

This chapter has set itself the rather narrow task of criticizing what it described as logical inconsistencies bedevilling the current, and old, presentations of the concepts of Arab nationalism. It suggests that these contradictions, which affect the positions and arguments, can be explained by the fact that Arab nationalism has been envisaged from

the beginning not as an intellectual creed or philosophy but rather as a political instrument to achieve certain ends; *i.e.* the arousal of some eastern Arab provinces against the Uthmaniyyah State. These ends have later developed to include the secularization and covert westernization of the Middle East Muslim Arabs, the pushing of non-Muslim or anti-Islamic elites into positions of influence and power, the legitimation of leadership ambitions, either by certain dictators or by Arab nationalist parties, and the establishing of an 'Arab' entity that is separate from the Islamic entity and made to stand against it after using some of the elements it created.

Arab nationalism was primarily conceived for an emotional, demagogic mode of propaganda and dissemination: hence the contradictions. The Arab crowds, it seems, could be sufficiently aroused by a jumble of slogans. Arab nationalism, that is, started life with a derogatory veiw of the Arab mentality.

When Arab nationalism began to feel the need for intellectual development, it could only magnify the contradictions inherent in itself in the way that I have traced. With its overwhelming western content Arab nationalism has, in fact, lost its independence and become a mere branch of some ideologies of the west but minus the intellectual sophistications. As I have earlier emphasized, it has practically ceased to be 'Arab' or 'nationalist' and has turned into a Trojan horse for internationalist forces encroaching upon the Muslim world. It combines with other secularized and westernized nationalisms fostered in various areas across the Muslim world to yield a pattern of attack upon the unity of that world and its identity.

The various brands of nationalism use the unification elements created by Islam to promote their own claims of independent and separate entities *vis-à-vis* Islam. They disintegrate the universal Islamic identity but they do not, as might be expected, end up in several entities. Rather, they are reunited again into another global system, that of western civilization in its widest sense. The nationalisms are claimed as smaller but more valid entities than the larger identity of Islam; but they soon reveal their essentially *dependent* westernized nature and merge into the universal western system in any or all of its political, economic, and cultural manifestations.

The crucial point in this development is the two contradictions that I isolated. The nationalisms represent intermediate stages in the confrontation between Islam and the west. They are seccessions from Islam which claim an independent identity but their essential content

is inescapably western and secular. This content and the practice of the ruling nationalist elites leads inevitably to identification with, involvement in, and gradual incorporation into the universal western 'project'. The nationalist elites cannot revert to Islam even if they wanted to because they have destroyed its universal system.

Thus nationalism of any type can be seen, from the strategic point of view, as an intermediate phase between the disintegration of a total Islamic polity and identity and either the incorporation or assimilation of the resulting nationalistic identities into the global western polity. This is the logic that is inherent in the content of the idea of nationalism itself as it was, and still is, presented across the Muslim world: a secularist, westernized content. Nationalism can only lead to western *inter*nationalism; it is in essence a temporary, unstable phase of political development that has been forced on the Muslim countries, ultimately throwing them into the lap of the west. No amount of chauvinism and calls for a return to either 'original culture' or 'the roots' can save the nationalisms from that fate.

The mere idea, terms, mode of perception, and outlook of the nationalisms have been western-oriented and inspired from the start. When they abandoned universal Islamic claims to priority, allegiance, unity, and political and social expression, they had no alternative but to join the west, the other global system that confronts Islam. Nationalist illusions of independence and identity were only preparatory stages in this development. They are good rallying cries against Islam, while they hide the western content of the nationalist doctrine. When the nationalisms have performed the destructive part of their mission, the separation from the Islamic identity, and attempt to embark on some form of building their own 'identity', they find themselves drawn to the western vortex. All the secularized nationalisms of the Muslim world, from that of Atatürk to the Arab variety, can be explained by and studied according to this formula. All the grandiose attempts to solve desperate problems of the nationalisms—using such concepts as 'the South' or 'the Third World'—can only increase the malaise because they are of western origin and conception and because they are confined to partial views in the economic field which only help to remove tensions in the global polity dominated by the west.

Finally, note that the framework defined here can also serve to criticize the similarly artificial revival in some Arab countries recently of the doctrinaire secularist tendency which has been moribund in

Egypt, for example, for many years. Secularism uses the same arguments of Arab nationalism and suffers from the same contradictions and even more. It insists that Islam be evacuated from the sphere of social, economic, political, and cultural action and guidance only to replace it with western views and values, some of them of Judeao-Christian origins while the rest are atheistic.

Chapter IV

Indonesian Nationalism: A Western Invention to Contain Islam in the Dutch East Indies

Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro

Introduction

The problems of 'Indonesian nationalism' cannot be understood without knowing the geographic setting that governs it. The former Dutch colonial empire of the East Indies, whose territorial 'integrity' is still kept intact, *i.e.* un-decolonized, and has got away with only its name changed from the 'Dutch East Indies' to 'Indonesia', is not a natural geopolitical entity. The entire region has been brought under one single super-colonial administration by the bloody sword of Dutch colonialism that held sway over the vast region from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the present time, although since December 27, 1949, the supercolony has been administered by the Javanese on behalf of the Dutch and other western interests under the name of the pseudo-nation of 'Indonesia'. Henry Kissinger had aptly observed long ago that Indonesia was nothing but a 'geographic expression' until the Dutch found it more efficient to unite the islands of the Indies under a single administration.[1] This was indeed the genesis of the present-day 'Indonesian nation' and 'Indonesian nationalism', created solely to justify the unified administration of the huge colony as a preserve of western imperialism.

As a geographic expression, 'Indonesia' covers an area equal in length to the distance between Moscow and Lisbon, and in width equal to that between Rome and Oslo, with a population in excess of 160 million, composed of as many diverse nationalities, languages, and cultures as are found in continental Europe. As there is no sense in talking about the existence of one European nationalism today, so there is equally no sense in talking about the existence of an

'Indonesian nationalism', although western media and scholars have naïvely propagated this concept.

Islam and the Dutch East Indies

There is only one common denominator among the various peoples of the Dutch East Indies, namely Islam: the religion of 95 per cent of these peoples. However, the Dutch could hardly build anything on the basis of Islam which had been their number one enemy to begin with. Had they not in fact wrested control over these huge territories from half-a-dozen Muslim States that had existed before their arrival, such as Banten, Demak and Mataram on the island of Java; Bandjar on the island of Borneo (Kalimantan); Bone and Macassar on the island of Celebes (Sulawesi); Ternate' on the islands of the Moluccas; and finally Acheh on the island of Sumatra, against which the Dutch had to fight the biggest war in all their history? As the Dutch historian, Paul Van 't Veer commented:

> The Netherlands had never fought a war greater than the one against Acheh. In terms of the time of its duration, this war can be called the eighty years war. In terms of casualties—more than 100,000 dead—it was a military event that has no equal in the history of our land. For a century, Acheh War was the centre of our diplomatic, military, internal and international politics.... No place in the Dutch East Indies—Indonesia—can be compared with Acheh. A war that lasted that long, casualties that many, costing more than half a billion good 19th century Dutch gilders were the proofs of that. We did not know that in 1873 (when the Dutch first invaded Acheh). But we know that now. Let that stand, so the people in Holland, and even more so in Java, can have some ideas what kind of men the Achehnese are.[2]

But the Achehnese are simple Muslims. They are the living proof of the strength of Islam in the East Indies. General Van Swieten, who was the commander of the Dutch second invasion of Acheh in 1873–1874 (the commander of the first Dutch invasion, General Kohler, was executed by the Achehnese forces) and who was hailed, somewhat prematurely, as 'the conqueror of Acheh', finally came to the conclusion that 'there was no way to defeat the Achehese in war', and

he recommended withdrawal and a negotiated peace.[3] The Dutch government rejected his proposal and so the war went on.

It was the continuous defeat of the Dutch that finally brought the orientalist and 'Islamicist' Christian Snouck Huurgronje to the forefront. He was considered a genius by his people and was described by Multatuli, a famous Dutch writer, as the second most important man in the history of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia during the nineteenth century. In orientalist circles he was regarded as one of the two foremost European authorities on Islam (the other one was Ignaz Goldziher of Hungary).

Huurgronje was asked to use his knowledge of Islam to find ways to defeat the Achehnese Muslims. His official instructions from the Dutch government read, in part, as follows: 'To study the conditions of the religious party in Acheh after the death of Tengku Tjhik di Tiro, and to find out their new disposition and to make recommendations.'[4] The Dutch had entertained high hopes that the martyrdom of the Achehnese leader, Al-Malik Tengku Tjhik Muhammad Saman, on January 25, 1891, would bring the Achehnese resistance to an end. That, however, did not happen; the resistance continued. This was why Huurgronje was dispatched to Acheh. Ultimately, he failed to achieve his objectives in Acheh because the Achehnese Muslims refused to co-operate with him; he could not influence them. However, despite his failure in Acheh, Huurgronje did emerge as the architect of the Dutch government's 'Islamic policy' in the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. His recommendations were accepted as official policy to the very end of the formal Dutch control of the East Indies, until the time of the illegal transfer of 'sovereignty' to their marionette, Javanese Indonesia, created in their own image, on December 27, 1949.

The Dutch 'Islamic Policy'

Christian Snouck Huurgronje formulated, in no uncertain terms, the objectives the Dutch colonialist regime must attain: namely, that Islam be destroyed as a politico-religious faith, albeit slowly and very subtly; Indonesia must be secularized and westernized, preparing the way for an eventual lasting union with the Netherlands that would be made possible on the grounds of a 'common' culture obtained through the success of his policy. This end, among others, was to be achieved

by isolating the Muslims of the Dutch East Indies from any contact with the *Ummah* outside the Dutch East Indies. For this purpose, pilgrimage to Makkah and Hajj was to be very strictly controlled. Huurgronje was for using violent tactics, if necessary, to depoliticize Islam; for the Achehnese he even prescribed torture to destroy their 'over-confidence' and 'superiority complex' *vis-à-vis* the Dutch. In Huurgronje's own words, 'de Atjehers gevoelig te slaan en zo hun superioriteitswaan te ontenemen' (Achehnese must be hit in the most sensitive painful manner so that their superiority complex can be destroyed).[5] This was strange advice from a student of theology. But it was to no avail because it merely strengthened the Achehnese resolve to achieve martyrdom. Huurgronje had mistaken the proper Achehnese Muslims' attitude towards the invading infidels for a 'superiority complex'. In short, the Islam that was to be allowed in Indonesia, under Huurgronje's scheme of things, was in the form of rituals only. Meanwhile, the educational system for Muslim children was to be secularized. Finally, the overall supervision and leadership to implement these policies was to be entrusted to the Javanese aristrocracy, the group that Huurgronje trusted would be willing and able to secularize and westernize Indonesian Muslim society according to Dutch prescriptions.[6]

However, when Huurgronje permitted that a ritual Islam be allowed to continue, he had, in fact, conceded practically the whole thing, because Islamic rituals are in a different category from the rituals of other religions. Islamic rituals are in themselves the fount, the living, vibrant roots of the faith. This escaped Huurgronje's comprehension because he was not a Muslim. Islamic rituals are yearly, monthly, weekly, daily, nightly, even hourly 'rites of passage' that renew the Muslims' commitment to Islam anywhere, any time and under any situation.

In the event, Huurgronje's advice was fully adopted and enforced as the official 'Islamic policy' of the Dutch colonial government towards the *Ummah* in the Dutch East Indies until the outbreak of World War II, and again when the Dutch returned from 1945–1949. The Dutch wanted to keep every inch of their conquered territories united under a single administration in Jakarta for maximum profit, economy and ease of control, but they recognized the need to create a new common denominator to replace Islam among the peoples. This new common denominator was to be a secular, westernized culture in common with the Dutch culture to facilitate the eventual political union between

Indonesia and Holland. So the Dutch search for an alternative to Islam as a base for Indonesian 'unity' was a principled and most serious pursuit. The idea of secularization led naturally to the idea of an Indonesian 'nationalism'. But how can one inclusive 'nationalism' be created in a multi-national empire, covering an area as large as western and eastern Europe put together? If one European nationalism could not be created until now, with all the background unity of a European civilization, a European culture and an integrated system of communication, and a contiguous territory to boot, how could the creation of an 'Indonesian nationalism' even be contemplated in a vast non-contiguous region, composed of myriads of archipelagoes, with one part separated by thousands of kilometres from others, without either a common language, culture, economy, or history? A unity under the banner of Islam would have been the most natural and desired by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of all nationalities, but that was against everything the Dutch stood for and wanted. A unity based solely on the force of the sword would have been fragile and illusory: that was admitted by all Dutchmen. So, a secular Indonesian 'nationalism', purged of any association with Islam, was accorded a consensus among Dutchmen of all persuasions, left, right, centre, liberal and conservatives alike, except for the most obtuse.

'Indonesian Nationalism'

Despite all the contradictions, however, an 'Indonesian nationalism' was promulgated and made a key part of Indonesia's State ideology, the *pancasila*. But for all intents and purposes, 'Indonesian nationalism' became, in fact, a cover-up for the nascent Javanese nationalism, that of the real new ruling class, whose aims, purposes and symbolisms were projected to represent 'Indonesian nationalism', that is the projection of a sectional, partial, local interest as the national, general interest. This fact can be easily observed. For example, all symbols of 'Indonesian nationalism' are expressed in Javanese language idioms: the State ideology is called *pancasila*, Javanese for 'five principles';[7] the Indonesian 'national' motto is *Bhinneka tunggal ika*, Javanese for 'unity in diversity'; the names of all Indonesian State decorations are in Javanese; the status of first-class national hero is reserved for Javanese and all positions of power and prestige in Indonesia are reserved for the Javanese. In addition the names of the State's administrative

divisions and the titles of functionaries are expressed in Javanese: *desa* for a village and *lurah* for a village head; *kecamatan* for sub-district and *camat* for head of sub-district; *kabupaten* for district, and 'bupati' for its head, and so on *ad infinitum*. The supposed official language may not be Javanese yet, but this is only because nobody would understand Javanese in 95.4 per cent of Indonesia's territory; therefore Malay has to be used.[8]

The Javanese are in a favourable position to expropriate 'Indonesian nationalism' for themselves for a number of reasons: first, they are the favoured groups by the deliberate choice of the Dutch—did not Eduard D. Dekker, the Dutch novelist, write: 'Serving his Master is the *Religion* of the Javanese'? Second, although not the majority, they represent the largest single group among the inhabitants. Third, their homeland happened to be on the island of Java that was chosen by the Dutch to be the centre of the colonial administration because it was the first to be colonized and because of the 'reliability' of its population from the Dutch point of view, thus facilitating Javanese control over it. Finally, it was indeed to them that the Dutch had officially transferred their 'sovereignty' over all of Indonesia on December 27, 1949, to the exclusion of all other nationalities.

Even Acheh Sumatra was given to the Javanese instead of being returned to the Achehnese, the indigenous people of that country, who have more claim to the territory because the Dutch had taken it from them and not from the Javanese. Nor could this fact have been forgotten easily, because the Dutch had to fight the Achehnese for almost a century. Yet instead of returning the country to the people of Acheh Sumatra, the Dutch gave it to the Javanese. In doing so, the Dutch violated all the known rules of international law and decolonization procedures of the United Nations which prohibited any transfer of sovereignty over any colonial territory by a colonial power and stipulated that sovereignty over each colonial territory belongs to the indigenous people of that territory, who must be set free without any conditions and without further delay.[9] The real reason, however, went even further than the mere calculation of economic interests: if the Dutch had turned Acheh Sumatra over to the Achehnese it would have become the first Islamic State to re-emerge in Southeast Asia.

All these, however, did not alter the fact that Java represents only 7 per cent of Indonesia's territory. The other 93 per cent of Indonesia's territories are overseas from Java; some are two to three

thousand kilometres away and inhabited by peoples of different nationalities, races, languages, and cultures totally alien to the Javanese, making the 93 per cent of Indonesia's territories in fact overseas colonies of Java, as it were. For, in the simplest terms, 'colonialism is rule over peoples of different race inhabiting lands separated by salt water from the imperial centre'.[10]

Thus, to make a sham 'nationalism' look real, a geographic expression has been called a 'country' and a 'nation'. Malay, a language of Sumatra, was commandeered to become 'Indonesian', although the Javanese do not speak (let alone write or understand) it. So today they have ruined it—they have made it the equivalent of Pidgin English to the English language. This so-called 'bahasa Indonesia', alias Javanese Malay, is a kind of 'Pidgin Malay' where the grammar of the classic Malay—a Muslim tongue—has been violated and its syntax disregarded. Further, it has been mixed up indiscriminately with unassimilated and unnecessary foreign words of assorted European languages, making it no longer intelligible to the Malay people themselves. Javanese Malay has become a grotesque language that is no longer fit for literature, poetry or serious discourse as far as the Malay peoples are concerned. The name of Indonesia itself is Greek to the peoples of the East Indies, a foreign nomenclature that bears no relation whatever to their history, language, culture and literature.

To complete the paraphernalia of the 'new' nation and the brand new 'nationalism', an upside-down Polish flag was adopted as the 'Indonesian flag'—a flag without history and without glory as far as the peoples are concerned. The plagiarized Yale Boola-Boola song was adopted as the 'Indonesian national anthem'. And to top it all, a two-sentence, thoughtless 'declaration of independence', devoid of any idea, much less a philosophy or a programme, was issued. Among civilized nations, a declaration of independence is a symbol, next to the flag, a statement of moral excellence and legitimacy, a brief for that nation's *raison d'être*. Indonesia's 'declaration of independence', however, was but a brief news bulletin.

The whole affair would be a farce if it were not for the river of blood that it has been spilled and which still continues to flow to this day. The farce inaugurated forty years of continuous bloodshed, of anarchy of the State. Forty years of officially condoned massacres, resistances and repressions that finally brought the military back to the helm—that is back to the stark reality of colonialism, and the exercise of its

illegitimate and illegal power. The Dutch sword has merely been replaced by Javanese guns—to keep the 'unity' of the 'Indonesian nation' for no other purpose than western exploitation as the cheapest source of raw materials for the west's industries. Western journalists and scholars have found it agreeable to call this 'stability' and 'economic progress'.

Indonesian Nationalism and the Javanese Military State

The emergence of the Javanese colonialist State is patent proof of the death—in fact of the non-existence—of 'Indonesian nationalism'. Since the sixteenth century, Indonesia has always been (with the exception of Acheh Sumatra) a colonial empire and a colonial empire can only be ruled by force of arms. Colonialism and militarism are inseparable; one cannot exist without the other. The Dutch had created and preserved this colonial empire by force for 350 years, from 1599–1949, when they transferred it to the Javanese. Since then, the Javanese mercenaries have carried out the 'white man's burden' with catastrophic consequences for all colonized non-Javanese peoples of the East Indies, from Acheh Sumatra to West Papua and from the Moluccas to Timor. Since 1949, the time of the illegal transfer of sovereignty, hardly any island has not been used as a battlefield, and there is hardly any non-Javanese nationality whose blood had not been shed by Javanese troops. There have been revolts against Javanese colonialism on every island, just as there were revolts against Dutch colonialism before.

The Dutch East Indies were never decolonized, in contrast to all colonial territories in the rest of the world. The Dutch merely transferred their colonies to the Javanese, lock, stock and barrel, without returning even one inch of territory to the rightful people of that territory as prescribed by the Decolonization Law of the United Nations. The Dutch simply made the Javanese—for an agreed price—the heir of their colonial empire, disregarding the rights of the non-Javanese peoples to self-determination and independence. The Dutch and Javanese conspiracy against the International Law and De-colonization principles of the United Nations was justified by the fiction of 'Indonesian nationalism' and an 'Indonesian nation'. Yet the massive and desperate struggles for self-determination, waged by the Muslim majority and even by non-Muslim minority groups, were and

have never been truthfully reported in the western media, which insisted on calling the freedom-fighters 'separatists', 'fanatics', or 'insurgents'. One book written by a western journalist is even called *Rebels Without a Cause*, as if there are peoples on earth eager to die for no cause. All this resistance against the Indonesian State proves that the peoples concerned knew that 'Indonesian nationalism' and 'nation-hood' were merely a hoax to disenfranchise and colonize them.

The ink of the Dutch and Javanese signatures had barely dried on the Treaty transferring Dutch 'sovereignty' to the Javanese, when the Muslims in Pasundan (West Java) declared an Islamic State there, under the leadership of Imam Kartosuwirjo. In April, 1950, the people of the South Moluccas declared their independence from Javanese Indonesia, under the leadership of Dr. Soumokil. In 1952, the Muslims of the Celebes (Sulawesi), under the leadership of Abdul-Qahar Muzakkar, declared the establishment of an Islamic State there and severed all relations with the Javanese regime of Indonesia. The Muslims of Borneo (Kalimantan) followed suit under the leadership of Ibnu Hadjar. In 1953, the Muslims of Acheh (Sumatra) also announced the re-establishment of the Islamic State there and severed all relations with Javanese Indonesia. These armed resistances against the Javanese republic of Indonesia, in 93 per cent of the territory claimed by the Javanese republic, should have been enough evidence for all thinking men and women about the non-existence of the so-called 'Indonesian nationalism'.

Instead, the Western press chose to call these wars of liberation and self-determination of the non-Javanese peoples the 'growing pains' of the Indonesian republic. The Javanese colonialists called these freedom-fighters 'traitors' but on their own homelands they were called heroes of the peoples—*mujahideen*. Could this sort of thing have happened if there were a real Indonesian nationalism that really united these peoples? Clearly, there was no shared 'collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret' between the Javanese and the rest of the peoples of the East Indies. These are sentiments which, according to John Stuart Mill, are key indicators of the existence of a nationality. Apparently none existed in Indonesia. By 1965, all the leaders of Islamic liberation movements, such as Imam Kartosuwirjo of West Java, Abdul-Qahar Muzakkar of Sulawesi, and Ibnu Hadjar of Kalimantan, were martyred—murdered by the Javanese regime. Dr. Soumokil of the South Moluccas, who was a Christian, was also murdered by the Javanese Indonesian forces.

There is still more proof of the counterfeit nature of Indonesian nationalism: the atrocities committed by the Indonesian 'National' Army against fellow Indonesians. Mass murders and massacres have been the order of the day from the issuance of 'the bulletin', *i.e.* the declaration of independence, of Javanese Indonesia, in August 1945. To date, approximately 5 million people have met their death through the State's inflicted wounds all over the 'Indonesian' archipelago. 2 million were recorded in the six month period at the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965 when the Javanese military seized power. Before and after that, over a much longer period of time, the victims were less carefully tabulated. There was, for example, the massacre of Pulot Tjot Djeumpa in Acheh in 1956, where the Indonesia National Army lined up 200 men, women and children as well as the elderly, and machine-gunned them to death. This was not a rare occurrence in Javanese Indonesia. Other such massacres took place in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Moluccas, West Papua and East Timor. Atrocities and tortures of the most bestial kinds are perpetrated daily by the Indonesian National Army against fellow 'Indonesians'. Any human being imbued with the most rudimentary sentiments of 'national' feeling would not be capable of behaving thus against his own kind. This indicates that a true Indonesian national consciousness does not exist. The sociologist Franz Oppenheimer probably put his finger on the problem when he stated that, 'we must not conclude the existence of a national consciousness from the existence of a nation, but on the contrary, the existence of a nation from the existence of a national consciousness.'[11]

Although the Indonesian army is called Tentera 'Nasional' Indonesia, most of its rank and file are Javanese gunmen who look down upon the non-Javanese peoples as foreign and so subject to the Javanese 'masters'. The army is also organized according to ethnic categories for more effective use in suppressing ethnic rebellions that have become the real reason for its existence. Thus, if the Moluccan people were rebelling, then the Javanese regime would send non-Moluccans, say Sundanese troops, to suppress them. If the Achehnese were rebelling, then the Moluccan troops would be sent to suppress it. And so on, following the old familiar practice of the Habsburg empire of sending Czech batallions to crush Slovak rebellions, or Hungarian regiments to suppress Croatian uprisings, to make sure that no emotional ties exist

between the people to be crushed and the troops. In the short run, this policy will ensure the effectiveness of the repression; in the long run, it serves the policy of divide and rule, by enhancing antagonisms among the ethnic groups and thus guaranteeing the perpetuation of the authority of the central regime. During the Habsburg empire, this policy ensured the perpetual power of Vienna; in today's Indonesia it guarantees Jakarta's control of the outlying colonies, called 'provinces'. In such a situation, it is ludicrous to imply the existence of an 'Indonesian nationalism', just as it would have been naïve to imagine the existence of an Austro-Hungarian 'nationalism' under the Habsburgs.

Another proof of the non-existence of a true 'Indonesian nationalism' was provided by the experimentation with the party system before the emergence of the Javanese military colonial State. The last fairly, free elections held in Indonesia were in 1955 and 1957. The results of both these elections showed that the PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, i.e. the 'Nationalist' Party of Indonesia) got the bulk of its votes only in Central and East Java, the homeland of the Javanese ethnic group. The party got either few or no votes at all in non-Javanese territories, except from Javanese immigrants called 'transmigrants' there. By contrast, the Muslim party (Mashumi), although winning very few votes in Javanese ethnic territories, received most of the votes cast outside Java. The Muslim party was the only 'nationwide' party. Clearly these results demonstrate the widespread appeal of Islam to the population of Indonesia, irrespective of their national origins, in contrast to the limited, sectional, almost local appeal of 'Indonesian nationalism' to the Javanese ethnic areas, where secularism and nationalism have been propagated.[12]

Javanese Nationalism and Imperialism

Under the cloak of an impossible 'Indonesian nationalism' a Javanese nationalism has been given an opportunity to emerge triumphant. Although 'Indonesian nationalism' is itself a fake, it has become an effective mask for a real Javanese nationalism and its will to project its exclusive special and sectional interest as the 'national' one over the heads of the non-Javanese peoples and their homelands, while mediating with foreign powers for recognition of Javanese primacy and hegemony over this vast region (which constitutes approximately

80 per cent of the territory of Southeast Asia). This Javanese primacy and hegemony, however, can never be maintained without the tacit approval of neighbouring States. This is the strategic vulnerability inherited by Javanese Indonesia from the Dutch East Indies because even the Dutch colonial empire could never have existed for even a single day without British diplomatic and even (at times) military support and protection. This is so, primarily because Indonesia is not a natural geopolitical entity.

The Dutch East Indies existed by courtesy of the British when the British lost patience with the Dutch, as they did during the Napoleonic Wars. Stamford Raffles moved easily from Singapore to Java, and sent the Dutch packing. The fact that the British decided to give the East Indies back to the Dutch is yet another demonstration that the then Dutch East Indies, like the now Javanese Indonesia, existed only by courtesy of the neighbouring States singly, as was the case with the British then, or collectively, as is the case with ASEAN now. If another proof is needed, then here it is. During World War II, the Dutch empire of the East Indies, already called Indonesia, collapsed simply by the mere presence of the Japanese army in Singapore! Today, the existence of Javanese Indonesia depends on the courtesy of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and, by extension, the United States and the Soviet Union. This is advisedly said, because even the superpowers cannot protect Javanese Indonesia from its tiniest neighbour. That is why Indonesia needs ASEAN as no one else does.

Javanese Indonesia is a State that cannot antagonize any State. It cannot confront any other State because any confrontation with anyone means the end of Javanese Indonesia as we know it today. Last time they were lucky to have ended the confrontation with Malaysia just in time. Otherwise there would be no Javanese Indonesia today. Consequently, Javanese Indonesia cannot have a foreign policy unless it be that of getting along with everybody.

Java, like Holland before it, has unreasonably tried to hold on to so vast a territory that it is absolutely impossible for it to do so let alone defend it. No country the size of either Holland or Java—especially Java without any industrial base and among the most backward of the backward countries—can defend an empire with coastlines in excess of 25,000 kilometres with a hostile population. The much-bragged-about Javanese defence plan for 'territorial war' (*Perang wilajah*) by

waging a guerrilla war against any invader was just that: braggadocio! You cannot wage a guerrilla war when the local peoples are against you. This situation has obviously escaped the observation of the powers that are now so busy arming the Javanese Indonesian army, or else they are just interested in relieving the Javanese of his ill-gotten cash while they can and while he still has it.

James Soudon, the cautious Dutch Minister of Colonial Affairs, wrote the following words at the time of the mounting Dutch conflict with Acheh, reflecting his worries about the consequences of acquiring more territory: 'I see each further spreading of our authority in the East Indian Archipelago as a step further toward our over-throw, and the more so as we are already now grown far above our own strength'.[3] When a few years later, on March 26, 1873, the Dutch attacked Acheh and were roundly defeated at the Battle of Bandar Acheh, a member of the Dutch parliament in The Hague stated that, 'the repulse in Acheh and the enterprise taken altogether, will prove the last blow to the authority of Holland in the Eastern World'.[14] This was no exaggeration, as history has subsequently shown.

'Great empires die of indigestion', Napoleon observed. That had been the fate of the Roman Empire and of the Dutch East Indies. It is also the inevitable fate of Javanese Indonesia, although it survives for the time being by the courtesy of its neighbouring States. Javanese Indonesia, which is held up in the west as a paragon of 'stability', is in reality the sick man of Southeast Asia.

Notes

1. Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 1957, Harper, Ox. p. 256.
2. Paul Van 't Veer, *De Atjeh-Oorlog*, 1969, p. 76.
3. J. Van Swieten, *De Waarheid over onze vestiging in Atjeh*, 1879.
4. Paul Van 't Veer, *De Atjeh-Oorlog*, p. 187. Cf. C. Snouck Huurgronje, *De Atjeher*, 1906.
5. C. Snouck Huurgronje, *De Atjeher*, 1906.
6. C. Snouck Huurgronje, *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. IV, pp. 111–248, Bonn & Leipzig 1927, *passim*, *Ambtelijke Adviezen*, 1889–1936, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1965, *passim*, *Nederland en de Islam*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1915, *passim*.
7. These principles are: belief in God (including animistic gods), Indonesian nationalism, democracy, humanitarianism and social justice. *Cf.* Tengku Hasan di Tiro, *Democracy for Indonesia*, New York, 1958, pp. 79–82; also *Crescent International*: 'Javamen opt for paganism', Mar. 16-31, 1984; 'The Menace of Pancasila', Feb. 16–28, 1985; 'Islam outlawed in Indonesia in favour of pagan Pancasila', July 1–15, 1985; 'Islam abolished in Indonesia', July 16–31, 1985.
8. The island of Java represents only 7 per cent of Indonesia's territory but Javanese is spoken in two thirds of it because West Java is populated by Sundanese who speak their own language. Thus, Javanese is actually spoken only in 4.6 per cent of Indonesia territory.
9. United Nations' General Assembly Resolution 1514–XV, *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries & Peoples*, December 14, 1960.
10. Rupert Emerson, 'Colonialism: Political Aspects', *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*.
11. 'Wir Mussen nicht aus der Nation da Nationalbewusstsein, sondern umgekehrt aus dem Nationalbewusstsein die Nation ableiten', Franz Oppenheimer, *System der Soziologie*, Vol. I, p. 6.
12. *Cf.* Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro, *Masa Depan Politik Dunia Melaju*, New York, 1965; Atjeh, 1984; *Demokrasi Untuk Indonesia*, New York and Atjeh, 1958.
13. Paul Van 't Veer, *De Atjeh-Oorlog*, p. 15.
14. *The New York Times*, May 6, 1873.

Chapter V

Nationalism and Kashmiri Muslims
Bashir Ahmed Dabla

Introduction

The emergence of nationalism in eighteenth century Europe, as one of the dominant ideologies, provided the doctrinal basis for the historic transformation—from empires to nation-States—to a new political order of our time. As other parts of the world came under European subservience the currents of nationalism swept through the colonized world. It became the creed of the new secular world order. It became a rallying force, in the hands of the newly emerging elites, for their struggle against alien rulers.

Hayes has described nationalism as a, 'modern emotional fusion and exaggeration' of two phenomena—nationality and patriotism.[1] It is used, generally, as a, 'consciousness, on the part of individuals or groups, of membership in a nation, or of a desire to forward strength, liberty, or prosperity of a nation.'[2] It is associated with the following characteristics of the nation: the idea of a common government; a defined territory; distinguishing features, such as language and descent; common interests; and a certain degree of common feeling or will.[3] Nationality seems to be a condition attributed to either a person or group of persons, 'who speak the same language, have common historical traditions and regard themselves as a distinct cultural society'.[4] Thus, nationalism is a political creed that underlies the cohesion of modern societies and legitimizes their claim to authority. It centres on the, 'supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state either existing or desired'.[5] In brief, nationalism has three important features. First, it is a concept which demands the loyalty of the individual and the group, primarily, to the nation-State. Second, it represents a desire of a

people to be united as a sovereign nation. Third, it is a phenomenon which exists in the form of either a state of mind or a general will.[6] In short, nationalism represents an ideology in the secular sense of the term and it affects the whole way of life. The indoctrination of the nationalist ideology, necessarily, means the replacement of other ideologies, particularly those of a religious nature.[7]

The swift growth of nationalism in the east can be related to the conditions of the colonial rule of the European powers. All the nationalist movements in the Muslim world were primarily irreligious and devoid of the basic contents of Islam.[8] They triggered a debate in the Muslim world about the religiosity of nationalism. Arguments have been made for and against the 'Islamicity' of nationalism. Our opinion is that nationalism, essentially, represents a parallel ideology to that of Islam. The reasons for this assumption are four. First, while nationalism concentrates upon a particular group of people having certain characteristics, Islam has a supranational character and is addressed to all individuals and groups without any differentiation. Second, the adoption of nationalism as an ideology means the preference for the secular borrowing from the west which, in all probability, accelerates the process of secularization. Third, nationalism initiates and intensifies the cultural plurality and social antagonism between various units and sub-units of the Muslim world. Fourth, nationalism, in all cases, dilutes the impact of Islam as the dominant ideology of the people as well as of the state.

Nationalism in Kashmir[9, 10]

Nationalism swept the Muslims in Kashmir as a result of the impact of colonialism. In fact, the history of modern Kashmir can be considered as the history of the emergence and assertion of Kashmiri nationalism, referred to as *Koshuriat* in Kashmir. It gave rise to a mass movement, in 1931, which represented the first organized effort of the Kashmiri Muslims against alien (*nuebrim*) domination, exploitation and feudal rule. This movement initiated the process of general emancipation, in the secular sense, of Muslims in Kashmir. Before 1947, when Kashmir came under the control of two countries, India and Pakistan, *Koshuriat* remained a dominant ideological creed and became a rallying force in the struggle against the feudal rule of the Maharaja. After 1947, it became the State ideology propagated and perpetuated

by the National Conference party under the leadership of Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah.

There is hardly any study which has analysed the Kashmiri Muslims' problems from an Islamic perspective. Our endeavour in this paper is two-fold. First we intend to evolve an Islamic/Muslim critique of *Koshuriat* and its impact; and second, to develop an objective assessment of all the developments in Kashmir in the past decades. Our effort will be to concentrate upon the reality of *Koshuriat*, how it emerged, how it determined subsequent developments, how it affected the Kashmiri Muslim intelligentsia and the Kashmiri Muslim masses, and, lastly, how it benefited the intelligentsia and betrayed the masses.

Though the 1931 mass movement in Kashmir initiated around the Muslim grievances against feudal rule, it gradually became secular. The Muslim Conference, which represented the interests of the Muslims in Kashmir, changed into a National Conference in 1939, advocating secularism as its policy and programme.[11] The secular character of *Koshuriat* was mainly a result of the strong influence of the Kashmiri Pandits,[12] leaders of the Congress party, especially M. K. Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Azad, and the Hindu Communists. The 'Naya Kashmir' (New Kashmir) document, which was adopted by the National Conference, unanimously, in 1944, was a programme for the future socialist reconstruction of modern Kashmir. This document has been called a 'socialist manifesto' in its content and essence and a 'communist manifesto' in its actual construction.[13]

The Muslim perspective of *Koshuriat*, which prevailed in the early 1930s, could not withstand the changes. First, the traditional Muslim leadership in Kashmir functioned within the framework of a feudalized Islam' whose interests coincided with the maintenance of the feudal system. This leadership often lent its support to the feudal rulers, even non-Muslims, in order to safeguard its interests. Since it did not come out openly against the alien rule, its legitimacy was lost among people whose leadership was taken over by young revolutionary Muslims. Second, the young Muslim leadership, which had undergone a western education, was deeply influenced by the ideals of nationalism, secularism and socialism. The adoption of the irreligious path by this leadership may be explained in terms of its lack of historical sense and anticipation of future catastrophes, its distorted understanding of Islam and the grand promises and pressure tactics of the Kashmiri Pandits, Communists and Congress leaders. Third, the

Islamic perspective of *Koshuriat* could be neither conceived nor developed mainly because of the absence of any organized Islamic movement in Kashmir in the 1930s.[14] The *rishi* (*Sufi*) influence on Islam in Kashmir had made it more of a folk religion than an ideology for change. This kind of Islam could not provide an alternative to the secular-socialist *Koshuriat* in its formative stage.

The Impact of Koshuriat

Political Impact

The adoption of *Koshuriat* necessitated certain political changes in its formative stage. That is why the conversion of the Muslim Conference into a National Conference and the adoption of 'Naya Kashmir' (New Kashmir) as the national programme was carried out successfully in 1939 and 1944 respectively. The logical outcome of these two attempts was Kashmir's accession to the Union of India in 1947. These attempts represent the basic betrayal of the Kashmiri Muslims. The argument is supported by three points. First, the Pandit-Congress-Communist leaders gave rise to these ideas and implemented them through the ruling Muslim elites even though the Muslim masses of Kashmir were neither consulted nor made aware of the reality of these attempts. Second, these attempts put a significant restraint on the Muslim-Islamic character of Kashmir. The chances for the emergence of Islam as a revolutionary ideology, a state religion and a social movement were subverted. Third, the accession isolated the Muslims of Kashmir from the rest of the Muslim *Ummah*. It married them with a country which had neither a history, geography, culture, language nor religion in common with Kashmir. It put them in a land where they had no identity and no respect. The argument of the Kashmiri nationalist stalwart that the accession would lead to the prosperity of Kashmiri Muslims proved baseless because their fellows outside India attained relatively better standards. At this stage, one historical fact must be emphasized: that while all factors—religious, historical, geographical, economic, political, social and cultural—had gone against the accession, it was materialized mainly on the basis of the ideological synonymity, their common faith in secularism, between the Kashmiri and Indian nationalist leaders.[15]

The Response of India

After the temporary accession, the Kashmiri nationalists began implementing their ideals for land reform, the abolition of usury and the availability of free education. But such hurdles were created by their opponents that the very essence of these reforms was negated. In this way, the reality of secularism came to the fore. The Indian leaders' commitments to equality for Muslims under secularism proved baseless. The Kashmiri Pandits, the Dogras and other Hindu communalists in Kashmir, Jammu and Delhi made a tirade against the Muslim Kashmiri nationalists, especially Shaikh Abdullah, as the change had affected the Hindus. Their sole objective was to reverse the trend of change which had benefited the poor Muslim peasants and workers of Kashmir. The outrage of these forces led to the utilization of brute state power against the Muslim Kashmiri nationalists, resulting in their arrest in 1953. Two developments followed. On the one hand, Shaikh Abdullah adopted an anti-Indian posture, but it did not contribute to the Islamic-Muslim perspective of *Koshuriat*.[16] On the other, India began the rigorous Indianization process of Kashmir. A well-planned policy was initiated by the Indian government *vis-à-vis* Kashmir which had two important facets. First, a series of unrepresentative and corrupt governments were imposed upon the people of Kashmir. This was done consciously so that the puppet regimes followed every order from Delhi and eroded the 'special status' of Kashmir, guaranteed under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Second, the Muslims in Kashmir were always divided so as to make their voice ineffective.

Historic Surrender and Aftermath

Though the people of Kashmir suffered, they chose the Shaikh's side, primarily, because he represented their aspiration for the right to self-determination. The 1950s and 1960s saw the struggle of the Kashmiri Muslims for their independence.[17] The struggle enabled them to remain aloof from the national mainstream of India. However, the Kashmiri Muslims had to face humiliation at the hands of their nationalist leaders in the early 1970s after the fall of Dhaka to the Indian forces. Shaikh Abdullah abandoned his struggle for the freedom of Kashmir which he had led from 1953–1974. He was re-installed as chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir in 1975. He was

kept on tenterhooks and finally removed in 1977.[18] The Shaikh realized that, despite promises, the policy of the Indian government had not changed but he could do little except resent his betrayal by India. At one stage, he challenged Mrs Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, for her policies towards Kashmir.[19] But the fact is that the Shaikh had enmeshed himself completely. He could not revolt but simply complain that the north Indian communalists were bent upon changing the demographic composition of Kashmir so that the Muslims would be turned into a minority. The Shaikh's death, in 1982, intensified the Indian hold on Kashmir. The agents of Delhi in Kashmir, who would never come out during the Shaikh's lifetime, began roaring in the streets of Srinagar. When Farooq Abdullah, Shaikh Abdullah's son, challenged them on the basis of mass support, his elected government was toppled in 1984.[20] Thus the way was paved for the permanent policy of installing puppet rulers and adopting the tactics of divide-and-rule in Kashmir.

Economic Impact

The political decisions taken under the influence of *Koshuriat* had serious economic implications for Kashmir. A relatively self-sufficient and independent economy was made a dependent economy in the course of post-accession. Economic growth was halted by the closure of the Jhelum Valley road, the only natural gateway to the valley of Kashmir, so denying easy road contact with national and international markets for Kashmiri domestic products. Instead, a dangerous road from Jammu to Srinagar was opened which meant only delay, loss and discouragement. Until this time, the famous Kashmiri fruits could reach national and international markets through the Jhelum Valley road in one or two days; through the Srinagar-Jammu road it took more than a week.[21] A conscious policy was adopted by the central government *vis-à-vis* Kashmir to make the latter economically dependent in order to pave the way for political integration. This policy was implemented efficiently and significant success was achieved. The degree of dependence of the present Kashmiri economy is so great that if the Jammu-Srinagar road closes for some days, the city of Srinagar faces riots because of the shortage of essential commodities, all, of which come from outside. It crudely reflects the common saying in Sriniagar that, 'Kashmir imports everything from India except the water of *Chashma Shahi* (the Shahi spring)'.

Economic Costs

Since all political regimes in Kashmir were sponsored by Delhi, they never concerned themselves with long-term planning. As a result, the Kashmiri Muslims could not control any organized sector of the economy. Though the Muslims have a monopoly over the world-famous traditional arts and crafts, they are nevertheless under-developed. Their organization is primitive, technology obsolete and profits meagre, especially for the workers. The average worker receives between 300 and 400 Indian rupees for working 10–12 hours a day and six days a week. The profitable and productive sectors, such as industry, trade and commerce, the professions and employment, have always been dominated by non-Muslims. Hindus (who constitute about 30 per cent of the population) hold 95 per cent and 55 per cent of jobs in central and state governments respectively.[22] The Hindu-dominated Jammu province is economically developed and this is reflected by the number of industrial units—1019—in 1971, when compared with 833 in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir.[23] Moreover, the Muslim rulers in Kashmir have often succumbed to the pressure of Jammu Dogras under orders from Delhi. That is why Jammu was able to snatch more funds from the state government. Even during the era of Shaikh Abdullah's rule, from 1975–1982, the Jammu province received a larger share of the allocated funds (in Indian rupees) than its entitlement while the Kashmir province received less than its due share, which can be seen in the following statistics:

	Kashmir (in lakhs)		Jammu (in lakhs)	
	Entitled Share	Allocated Share	Entitled Share	Allocated Share
1975–76	2,025.17	1,753.88	1,725.77	1,812.59
1976–77	2,648.30	2,388.47	2,256.78	2,271.06
1977–78	3,776.05	3,584.22	3,217.80	3,102.83
1978–79	4,820.68	4,012.99	4,107.99	4,431.84[24]

(one lakh = 100,000)

Thus the economy for Muslims, in Kashmir, remained static. If it changed, it benefited the Hindus more than the Muslims.

Social Impact

First, the adoption of *Koshuriat* and the subsequent political developments, especially the accession of Kashmir to India, took Kashmiri Muslims out of the Muslim social unit and put them into the broader Hindu social milieu. The sociological implications of this change were far reaching. On the one hand, the Kashmiri Muslims were cut off from the Muslim *Ummah*, though they constituted the majority in their homeland. On the other, they were taken into a cultural milieu which had no similarity with their own culture, traditions, norms and modes of behaviour.

Second, the Kashmiri Muslims faced the problem of cultural aggression. Since they had turned themselves into a minority, they were bound to be influenced culturally by their interaction with the Indians. Moreover, a well-planned policy of cultural assimilation was followed by the Indian Government through publications, newspapers, magazines, radio, television and film *etc.* The net result was the strong impact of Hindu culture upon the Kashmiri Muslims. This influence has also been referred to as the Hinduization of Muslims.

Third, the ideological indoctrination of Indian nationalism was made the supreme objective. In addition to other efforts, education was utilized fully for this cause through its central organization and in school syllabuses. Its effects were deeply felt. Muslim children in Kashmir learn about India but know hardly anything about Islam and Kashmir. As a result, a new generation of Muslim youngsters is growing up whose commitment to Islam, Muslims and Kashmir is questionable.

Fourth, Muslim social customs and the demographic composition of Kashmir experienced significant changes. Hindu-Muslim and Kashmiri-Indian marriages were encouraged. The demographic change lessened the dominant position of Kashmiri Muslims, whose proportion in the state has gone down from 68 per cent in 1961 to 65 per cent in 1971 and 63 per cent in 1981.[25] One of the major factors for this is the migration of Punjabi Hindus to Jammu. Moreover, the family-planning programmes have affected the growth rate of Kashmir, which declined to 26.42 per 1,000 in comparison to the Indian national growth rate of 30.57 per 1,000 during the decade 1971–1981.[26]

Fifth, systematic attempts were carried out to develop a generation with a completely secular outlook.

The Causation

Simple Questions

Several questions arise from the above analysis. How did all this happen? What factors were involved? Why could the traditional Muslim leadership not assert itself? Why did the young Muslim leadership adopt socialism and secularism? Why were the objectives of *Koshuriat* not fulfilled by the Muslim Kashmiri nationalist leadership? Why could Islam not be made the political ideology of the people of Kashmir who are known for their religious devotion?

Muslim Elites and Masses

As is clear from the above course of events in Kashmir, *Koshuriat* followed its natural path of development. Everything developed as it would for a secular-socialist ideology. In fact, *Koshuriat* in its infancy emerged from the aspirations of the Kashmiri Muslims for their emancipation after a long period of oppression, torture and exploitation. But it was soon diluted and distorted. It was secularized and socialized by the Hindu-Pandit-Communist intelligentsia and the feudal Muslim elite. The Muslim masses were hardly aware of these minute ideological details. In reality, they were not made sufficiently aware of what they were fighting for. Their ignorance permitted the ideological manipulation of the Muslim leadership. In this way, the Kashmiri Muslim leadership, which represented the first generation of local leadership after a long gap, could neither represent nor materialize the real aspirations of the Kashmiri Muslims.

Failure of the Religious Leadership

The traditional leadership in Kashmir had changed into an interest group: it was more concerned with safeguarding its own interests than with those of Islam. It was not antagonistic towards the alien rule. It neither provoked people nor led the revolt against the feudal rulers, though there were sufficient grounds for that. When the young Muslims with their modern education arrived in Kashmir, they realized people's aspirations and revolted against the alien domination. The Muslim masses supported them wholeheartedly and they assumed the leadership. In this way, the legitimacy and authority of

leadership shifted from religious to non-religious people in Kashmir and Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah emerged as the most powerful leader of the masses. As their understanding of the history of Islam, Muslims and Kashmir was meagre they were easily swayed by the alien ideologies. Socialism and secularism were dominant ideologies in those days in Asia, especially after the October revolution in Russia in 1917, the young Muslim leaders were attracted to these ideologies, which they considered revolutionary.

Young Nationalist's Failure

The young nationalist leaders were committed to certain basic changes according to the 'Naya Kashmir' programme. So, they had high hopes and expectations from the Indian leadership. The Indian leaders, however, had developed their own preferences and priorities. When the Muslim Kashmiri nationalists served their interests, they were applauded. When, however, they hurt their feudal interests, they were condemned, criticized and finally jailed, not once but repeatedly. When the Kashmiri nationalists demanded the restoration of basic human rights for Kashmiris, they were labelled 'anti-national'. When they raised their voice against the sufferings of Muslims in Kashmir, they were called 'communal'.

Islam and Islamic Movements

Islam has been the dominant religion in Kashmir. But it was not made the political ideology of the people at the crucial time of their history. This was mainly due to three factors. First, Islam in Kashmir developed a folk (*rishi*) character with roots in pre-Islamic traditions which place more emphasis on ritual. This kind of Islam could not provide the revolutionary ideology necessary at the initiation of the struggle against alien non-Muslim rulers. Second, the role of the traditional religious leadership was not completely Islamic; in some cases it was un-Islamic. It was often used against the Muslim interests in Kashmir. It was interested in the status quo because its status, authority, power and interests lay in the maintenance of the feudalized religious institutions. Third, modern Islamic movements had not emerged on the scene at the time of the initiation of the Kashmiri Muslims' struggle for freedom in the 1930s. They emerged in the following decades but remained primarily fringe or peripheral

movements in Muslim society. Their role as mass movements was almost non-existent.

The *Jama'at-e Islami* movement alone attempted to provide an Islamic dimension to *Koshuriat*. It strongly emphasized the Islamic identity of the Kashmiri Muslims, their relationship with the Muslims of the world, the liberation of Kashmir and the establishment of the Islamic State. It provided a strong critique of the Kashmiri nationalist leadership but it lacked the leadership and necessary intellectual tools for a revolutionary Islamic movement. While it preached the independence of Kashmir, it participated actively in Indian electoral politics. Finally, it started a political battle against the Kashmiri nationalists without mobilizing and preparing the masses, which led to its disastrous defeat.

Conclusion

The above analysis shows that the ideology of *Koshuriat* hurt the basic interests of the Kashmiri Muslims. In reality, it negated all that the Muslims stood for. Their political subjugation, economic exploitation, social segregation, cultural domination and educational backwardness continued in different forms. Though their commitment to Islam has not been challenged, the dominant alien impact is certainly draining them of their Islamic nature. Thus, it can logically be inferred that any ideology lacking roots in Islam can neither prove beneficial nor serve the fundamental interests of Muslims in any country.

Notes

1. C. J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York, Macmillan, 1926), pp. 5–29.
2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism—A Report by a Study Group of Members of RIIA* (London, Oxford, 1939), p. xvii.
3. *Ibid*.
4. R. S. Chavan, *Nationalism in Asia* (New Delhi, Sterling, 1973), p. 4.
5. Hans Kohn, 'Nationalism', *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by David L. Sills, Vol. 11 (USA, Macmillan, 1968), p. 63.
6. J. Kennedy, *Asian Nationalism in the 20th Century* (London, Macmillan, 1968), p. 3.
7. See Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York, Macmillan, 1960).
8. This does not necessarily mean that these movements were anti-Islamic in character. However, the movements de-emphasized Islam as an ideology and as the unifying force of Muslims.
9. Kashmir represents the territorial unit of Jammu and Kashmir State, comprising the regions of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh. At the time of partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Kashmir could not accede to Pakistan, as was the wish of the Kashmiri Muslims, mainly due to the role of the Hindu Maharaja. Subsequently, one-quarter of Kashmir territory came under Pakistani control (it was liberated by the Muslim rebels and given the name of 'Azad Kashmir'), two-thirds under India's control and some areas were grabbed by China. The total area of the Jammu and Kashmir state in 1981 was 80,900 sq. miles (Pakistani Kashmir 4,144 sq. miles and Indian Kashmir 16,773 sq. miles and the areas of Ladakh, Astore, Baltistan and Gilgit 63,554 sq. miles), See Mohammad Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiri's Fight For Freedom* (Lahore, Ferozsons, 1977), Vol. I, p. 1. The total population of Kashmiri's, inside and outside Kashmir, is 8 million (6 million in Indian Kashmir, 2 million in Pakistani Kashmir, and 1 million in different parts of the world, see *The Voice of Kashmir* (London) estimates in the early 1980s). While the Kashmir valley has a 94 per cent Muslim majority, Jammu and Ladakh provinces have Hindu and Budhist majorities respectively. The Muslims constitute 95 per cent in Pakistani Kashmir and 63 per cent in Indian Kashmir. The Kashmir valley is the most beautiful part of the state. While the scenic beauty of the valley has compelled outsiders to call it 'a paradise on earth' and 'Switzerland of Asia', not many people have concentrated upon the cruelties and brutalities perpetrated upon the inhabitants of this earthly paradise of land by its alien rulers in the last four centuries.
10. Muhamad Ishaq Khan, *Perspectives on Kashmir: Historical Dimension* (Srinagar, Gulshan Publishers, 1983), pp. 20–21.
11. Ghulam Hassan Khan, *History of Freedom Movement in Kashmir* (Delhi, Life and Light Publishers, 1981), pp. 322, 325-6.
12. Kashmiri Hindus are generally known as Kashmiri Pandits outside Kashmir. Their proportion in the population of Jammu and Kashmir state in 1981 was 2.7 per cent. Their literacy rate is 100 per cent and they are highly westernized. They have dominated the major sectors of the economy for many centuries. They represent a highly conscious and extremely conservative community in the Indian subcontinent.
13. M. A. Fazili, *Socialist Ideas and Movements in Kashmir, 1919–1947* (New Delhi, Euraka Publishers, 1980), p. 106.
14. The modern Islamic movements like that of *Jama'at-e Islami* emerged on the Kashmir political scene after the 1960s.
15. Even the Pandit nationalist leader, Prem Nath Bazaz, was not in favour of Kashmir's accession to India. See his book *Inside Kashmir* Srinagar, Kash. Publications, 1941.
16. See Shaikh Abdullah's statements and letters at that time.
17. See Mohammad Farooq Rehmani, *Azadi Ki Talash* (In Search of Freedom) Srinagar, 1981, and Saraf, *op. cit.*
18. For the Congress policy towards Shaikh Abdullah after 1975 see Mohammad Kasheer, '1983 Assembly Elections: Sociological Dimensions', *The Muslim*, Friday Special (Islamabad), October, 1983, p. 1.
19. Quoted in A. B. Ganei, *Kashmir National Conference and Politics, 1975–1980* Srinagar, Gulshan Publishers, 1984, p. 129.
20. For how the Congress party at the Centre masterminded toppling of the elected government of Dr. Farooq Abdullah in 1983, see J&K National Conference, *Toppling Game in Jammu and Kashmir* (Jammu, JKNC, 1984) and Farooq Abdullah, *My Dismissal* (New Delhi, Vikas, 1985).
21. The accession of Kashmir to India put a halt to the growth of the Kashmir economy. See Abdullah Lone, *Economic Consequences of Kashmir's Present Political Situation* Srinagar, 1968.
22. Bashir Ahmad, 'The Unfortunate Muslims of Kashmir', *Radiance* (New Delhi), 8 April, 1979, p. 9.
23. *Ibid*.
24. Jammu and Kashmir Government Statistics.
25. Census of India, *Jammu and Kashmir* (Provisional).
26. Census of India, *General Statistics*, 1981.

Chapter VI

Nationalism as an Instrument of Cultural Imperialism—A Case Study of French West Africa*

Malik N'Daiye

Introduction

The need for commercial expansion as a result of the industrial revolutions in England, France and Germany gave rise to increased competition over newly acquired territories as a source of raw materials. A multitude of new companies was formed to develop Africa commercially.

European competition over the control of Africa culminated in the Berlin Conference of 1884–85; the agreement reached resulted in the division of the Continent into English, French, German, Belgian and Portuguese spheres of influence. The stage was now set for these countries to colonize their respective spheres of influence.

In order to give way to a subservient political order, the colonies underwent a total transformation; new institutions replaced the old. Secularism became the new driving force for progress and development, and nationalism the new 'cementing' element in the modern societies. This was achieved through the introduction of a myriad of new ideas developed in Western Europe.

A new elite was created through education and patronage to perform the role of intermediaries. When power was transferred to this new elite to run the newly emerging nation-States that came into existence at the departure of the colonial powers, subservience became a permanent condition.

Africa had been prepared for colonization by three centuries of the slave trade, which had removed millions of young African men and women from their homes to become slaves in America. This coupled

* This is an abridged and edited version of the Arabic original. Translation into English by H. Shaheen Azmi.

with the long period of oppression made Africa an easy target for European occupation.

West Africa had known Islam since the ninth century CE. In the course of history, Muslims in Africa produced great centres of learning and commerce and created great empires. When the French occupied this area, during the nineteenth century, the Arabic language functioned as the official language of discourse between monarchs and governors. It was also the language of scholarship and all legal and diplomatic proceedings. The use of Arabic was not only restricted to Muslim kings but extended even to pagan rulers.

Initially, the French colonial administration accepted Arabic as the language of communication. Official proclamations and announcements of the period were routinely written in Arabic in the official newspaper of the day, the *Moniteur du Senegal*. During the period of French military conquest, mainly before 1900, Muslim opposition led by *Ulama* such as Mamadu Lamine, al-Hajj Umar and Samory was ruthlessly crushed. Once this period was over, pragmatism took over as the French policy towards Islam.[1]

French Islamic Policy

The problems associated with administering large territories with only a small number of European personnel, necessitated the creation of a class of intermediaries. The Muslims who supported the French took up this role. They had the crucial advantage not only of being literate but of having experience in the art of ruling.[2]

In 1879, the Director of Political Affairs for Senegal encouraged his best interpreters to learn Arabic, which was also used by commercial houses in their transactions in the hinterland.[3] During this period the French even allowed the application of Islamic Law to be continued simply becaue it was easily available in book form and was familiar not only to the Muslim population, but also the non-Muslim.[4]

These measures were based on the twin assumptions of pragmatism and the widely held view that, 'Islam represented a necessary stage of cultural evolution between pure barbarism and the understanding of higher French civilization'. Quellien was voicing the administration's view when he said: 'Muslim propaganda is a step towards civilization in West Africa, and it is universally recognized that the Muslim peoples of these regions are superior to those who had remained fetishist, in social organization, intellectual culture,

commerce, industry, well-being, the struggle for life and education'.[5] O'Brien has called it 'assimilation policy in retreat'; the difficulties of direct assimilation having been considered insuperable, Islam was found useful as an intermediate stage in the development from 'fetishness' to French status.[6]

The impact of men like Auguste Comte (1798–1857) on the development of human thought and civilization had a considerable effect on the thinking of French and British colonial officials. Comte considered the history of Europe as synonymous with the history of the human race and believed that all civilizations would necessarily develop along the same lines as western civilization. He maintained, in his 'Law of the Three Stages of Intellectual Development', that human thought gradually evolves, passing from the lowest stage, the theological stage, to an intermediate stage, the metaphysical stage, to the most advanced stage, the scientific or positivist stage.[7]

The thinking of Comte, coupled with the Darwinian theory of evolution, provided the moral justification for colonization; Europe was not only right to exploit the mineral resources of Africa, but also had a civilizational mission. In the early stages of colonial administration, therefore, Islam was 'encouraged', as Governor Faidherbe, who laid the foundations of French Islamic policy in West Africa, believed that Islam could be used both as a vehicle for the diffusion of a higher degree of civilization among Africans and as an instrument for the unification of French-occupied West Africa.[8]

This necessitated the creation of 'a controlled, a malleable, a pliable Islam that they could twist and bend to their purposes'.[9] To achieve this, Muslims were, on occasion, given special privileges, donations were made towards the construction of mosques, and passages were paid to Makkah. But where there was any hint of opposition Muslims were either harrassed, imprisoned or deported. This patronage helped in creating a breed of pliable *ulama*, or religious elite.

The secular Muslim elite was created through education, starting with *medersas* or Franco-Arabic colleges. These '*Medersas*' taught French language and culture in combination with Arabic and Islamic sciences 'to create an Islamic elite both loyal to the regime and equipped with the requisite skills to serve the administration'.[10] An analysis of the curriculum reveals that in each week twice as much time was spent on French studies as on Arabic.[11]

However, during the early period the French administration was more concerned with using leaders of Sufi orders either as informal or

even as formal agents of administration than with the secular Muslim elite. Apart from Faidherbe, other administrators who contributed greatly in developing a coherent policy included Robert Arnaud, Xavier Coppolani, Emile Combes and La Chatelier. Many of them had previous experience in dealing with Muslims in Algeria, where France had successfully constructed a sort of 'official Islam' with 'administrative mosques', the faithful covered by a census, civil service *cadis*, pilgrimage by authorization and a new model code, the bastard product of Muslim law and French jurisprudence.[12]

Combes proposed a similar policy for West Africa as well as other colonies:

> In the first place it would appear useful to study the possibility of placing the spiritual and temporal heads of the religious brother-hoods under our direction ... They could help to attract the sympathy of our Muslim natives if, instead of keeping them at a distance, out of a sort of traditional distrust, we could give them the title of *Imam* of their various *zawiyas*, and make them submit for our approbation the diplomas they give their *moqaddim*. Once these dispositions had been taken, the choice of the *chioukh* themselves would be ratified by our administration. We would place the *Chioukh-El-Islam*, supreme heads of the Muslim religion, who would be intermediaries with an interest in aiding our work of surveillance and moral reform.[13]

Robert Arnaud suggested procedures which might be used to win over the leaders of the brotherhoods:

> The first method constitutes a sort of decapitation of the brotherhood: it means winning over the leaders with material advantages which are easy to find when one has the administra-tive resources of the country at one's disposal ... A second procedure is to encourage the internal dissensions which the ambitions of certain persons excites within the brotherhood ... the principle of *divide et imperas* is here more applicable than ever.[14]

In 1906, Arnaud was entrusted with a mission by Governor-General Roume to travel throughout West Africa to prepare a report on the situation of Islam. This was followed by a series of studies by Paul Marty on Islam in the various French territories of West Africa. The object of such studies was, in large part, to provide assessments of

individual Muslim notables, particularly with regard to their attitudes towards the French authority. These studies were also pre-occupied with the 'threat of pan-Islamism'. As concern for the protection of the Uthmaniyyah Khilafat grew among the Muslims of West Africa 'localization' of Islam became a major concern of French admini-strators. Anything that encouraged concern for the wider *Ummah* was discouraged. In 1908, Arabic newspapers from abroad were banned. In 1910, some local Arabic newspapers were seized; the instruction from the Governor-General was to exclude 'all pan-Islamic' propaganda in West Africa. This included everything in Arabic except the Qur'ān and 'strictly religious' books.[15]

Froelich has summarized the policy adopted towards the leaders of the brotherhoods: 'We have favoured the heads of the brotherhoods and organized the travels of the great *marabout* while asking them, in exchange, to pacify spirits; we have treated them with the greatest honours; we have, at their demand, constructed schools, *medersas* and even mosques'.[16] Once success had been achieved in this area, French policy took a new turn.

The appointment of William Ponty as Governor-General (1908–1915) introduced a new twist to French Islamic policy. Ponty favoured what he termed a *politique des races*, under which traditional chiefs were given greater powers than they had so far possessed. The aim of such a policy was to preserve ethnic particularism by ensuring that each ethnic group had a chief appointed from among its own people. The *politique des races* encouraged ethnic separatism and was intended to prevent the spread of Islam to non-Muslims. The use of Arabic for official purposes was now to be avoided.[17]

Ponty's successor, Governor-General Clozel, gave further encouragement to the *politique des races*. He believed in a greater degree of respect for 'fetishism' and for the use of traditional (*i.e.* pagan) rather than Muslim law in courts. According to him, the *ulama* were to be watched carefully and allowed to travel only with an administrative permit. Mosques and Muslim schools were to be built only by administrative authorization which was rarely given.[18]

Clozel's policy was primarily designed to 'build barriers' in order to prevent the further diffusion of Islam by making use of traditional pre-Islamic beliefs. It was realized that Christian missionaries could offer no effective opposition to Islam.[19] Their activities were regulated, but the motive was not religious, as religion was merely the tool of the policy.[20] This failure of the Church made secular education

imperative; if the Muslims could not be converted to Christianity they must be secularized.

British colonial policy towards Islam in West Africa was no different. It was grounded in similar notions of social, cultural and intellectual development and guided by similar political considerations.[21]

French opposition to Islam manifested itself in four ways. First, in the persecution of resisting Islamic leaders. Second, in the persecution of teachers of traditional Islamic sciences. Third, in the separation of the Muslims in West Africa from co-religionists in other parts of the Muslim world. Finally, in the distortion and 'paganization' of Islam.

In its attempts to contain Islam the colonial administration actively persecuted those religious leaders who had not pledged allegience to French colonial rule. Slanderous fabrications were officially spread to discredit them. Some were detained, others exiled from their homelands and some even executed. French persecution was particularly intensive from 1905–1912, when a chain of imprisonments spread across French West Africa, from Senegal to Niger and from Mauritania to Guinea.

Robert Arnaud, whose advice on Islamic matters was extremely influential in the period before the First World War, justified these actions: 'Even if we don't admit ourselves the right to meddle into the religious affairs of a people, we are compelled to concern ourselves with individuals who desire to lead it [West Africa] in the direction of Islamic revolution'.[22]

The teachers of traditional Islamic science also came under strict surveillance. Arnaud said:

It is not enough that we require a Qur'ānic *medersa* (school) to be licensed, it is also incumbent that we closely observe those responsible for it. The *medersa's* teachings and its effectiveness must be a subject of concern, at all times, for the officials of the various departments. They should know what might result from teaching on application to public and private life. They must be aware of what influence visiting Shaikhs, roaming Shaikhs and returning pilgrims must have. . . .[23]

As stated above, after occupying West Africa, the colonialists concentrated on separating the Muslims of West Africa from the rest of the Islamic world. Visits from foreign Muslims were restricted; observers were appointed to supervise those visits that were

sanctioned. Those who wished to perform the Pilgrimage were required to obtain licences and procedures were made highly complicated. On this point Arnaud writes: 'As far as the colonial authorities are aware, those Senegalese who have travelled to Makkah in the last five years do not exceed in number eleven pilgrims or a handful'.[24]

In order to create disharmony among the Muslims, Islam was distorted by the infusion of local characteristics. Arnaud wrote: 'We have before us an honourable task in promoting in West Africa the development and persistance of an "African Islam"—in its fullest sense. We should administer its formation in accordance with the particular ideology of every group'.[25]

Likewise, the colonial administration sought to entice minds in West Africa into re-envisioning Islam through the notions of black consciousness, on the pattern of Black Christianity in southern Africa. Towards this end Arnaud wrote: 'In southern Africa Christians (whose numbers are many) are proceeding to found a completely black church—named "Habashiya". It befits us to move towards the founding of a "Habashiya Islam" in this region of West Africa'.[26]

French Education and its Goals

The French education system in West Africa reflected their policy of assimilation. An official document of 1909 relating to French Guinea states that one of the main aims of French education should be to 'make of the school an instrument for the diffusion of our civilization'. The other two aims were to train local auxiliaries, clerks, telephonists and so on, and to train skilled artisans. The curriculum in these schools was entirely French; Arabic and Islamic studies were excluded.[27]

As graduates from these schools started to come off the production line, the French insisted that all African employees of the administration must be qualified from French schools and be fluent in French. This created a demand for French education and gradually attracted young men away from the Islamic system of education. To further this aim, financial inducements were provided for parents to send their children to French schools. Teachers in Qur'ānic schools were offered financial bonuses if they included the French language in their curricula.

The Governor-General of French West Africa decreed on 15 July 1903, and 12 June 1912, the following:

— The requirement of licensing for all new Qur'ānic schools.
— The power to close Qur'ānic schools for public safety or for reason of unsanitary conditions.
— The prohibition of the religious instruction of children between the ages of six and sixteen during public school hours.
— An annual grant of 300 Francs to every Qur'ānic school that agreed to teach the French language for at least two hours every day.

Such measures were intended to extend a degree of control over Islamic education. But the offer failed to lure any teacher. No one agreed to alter his curriculum or requested a licence to open a Qur'ānic school. However, having lost their place of eminence as centres of learning and scholarship which they had occupied prior to the coming of the French to the area, they were soon reduced to insignificance.

Christian Evangelism: its Growth and its Goals

The first arrival of a monk to Senegal was in 1779. He took up residence in Saint Louis, the occupied portion of Senegal at that time. In 1840, three Senegalese were elevated to the position of priesthood for the first time. Monasteries were established in 1819 in Saint Louis, thus preparing the way for the arrival of a wave of missionaries in 1845. In the earlier years, with the support of the authorities, Christianity rapidly spread. In 1857, a large school for monks was opened. In 1863, Rome sent an Episcopal representative to Seneghambia.

The problem of Islam, however, soon confronted the bishops. It became clear to them that the conversion of the pagan regions was significantly easier than that of the Muslim regions. Senegal was considered a Muslim region. Missionary groups responsible for Senegal decided that it was more advantageous to send the best of their missionaries to regions more likely to accept Christianity such as Cameroon, the Congo and Gabon. Senegal, considered impenetrable, was left to the colonial administration to deal with. Despite this there were some 5 per cent Christian converts at the time of

independence in 1960. Power was transferred to this minority as it could be relied upon more to uphold colonial norms and values. (Leopold Sedar Senghor was president of Senegal for twenty years, 1960-79.)

Christian missionaries were an integral part of colonialism. Missionaries in a particular colony were largely nationals of the colonizing State. Nationals of another European state were required to register with the colonial administration, especially if they were aligned with conflicting sects within Christianity (for example, Catholics as opposed to Protestants).

The Missionary Approach

Education

All levels of education, from nursery to university, were employed as a means to spread the gospel. The first school in Saint Louis was opened in 1821. At that time schools were under the control of the Christian Society for Brotherhood. It was soon realized, however, that Muslim parents had an aversion to missionary schools. As a result, the first secular school in Senegal opened in 1860. In 1906, this school, then known as the School for the Sons of Chiefs, was renamed a *medersa*, or Franco-Arabic College. Similar *medersas* were established at Timbaktu, at Djenne and at Boutilimit in Mauritania.

Medicine and Relief

A conference of missionaries held in Senegal, in 1924, declared that 'medicine is one of the best means to proselytize to Christianity'. Concern for health in Africa first came from missionary societies in 1840. The goal at that time was to protect European missionaries from African diseases. The first medical mission was sent to West Africa in 1892 by a missionary church. Another medical mission dispatched to the coast soon followed, and remained there from 1895-1907.

In recent times, aid coming from western countries through either relief agencies or international Christian missions is distributed to the poor and bereaved through local church socities. This aid, especially if in the form of medicines, helps reinforce the wealth of local churches,

and assists them in their missionary task. The drought in areas of Africa has provided missionaries with an opportunity to extend their influence. The fact that no Islamic organization exists to provide any aid whatsoever, either at the local or the international level, has created a vacuum for the missionaries to fill.

The Challenges to Islamic Society

The undermining of three fundamental pillars of Islamic society, Islamic doctrine (ʿAqīdah), Islamic Law (Sharīʿah) and Islamic brotherhood (Ukhuwwah), has been the goal of all western education.

Islamic doctrine (ʿAqīdah) was made a target of attack because of its important role in guarding Muslim societies from the assimilating effects of subservience to western thought. The Islamic Law (Sharīʿah) shields Muslim societies from the circulation of vice and immorality amongst its individuals and communities. Because of its role in arming Muslim society against exploitation, it was targetted for elimination. The Islamic brotherhood (Ukhuwwah) was targetted, because it acted as a strong bond between the individuals and communities of a single nation as well as between Muslim nations throughout the world.

Instruments of French Policy Implementation

Secular Education

Secular education was envisioned as the main instrument leading to the distortion and disintegration of the grip of Islamic doctrine on Muslim society.

The Law

A secular legal system, with legislative bodies, was imposed over the long established Islamic legal system, where legal decisions (fatawa) of the religious scholars (ulama) played the legislative role.

Nationalism

Nationalism was imposed over the traditional perspective of Islamic brotherhood. This was intended to cause the disintegration of Muslim

unity through the construction of internal and external barriers between Muslims.

Neo-colonialism

Colonialism prepared for the colonists' departure by appointing nationalists and secularists to succeed them. Positions of authority were restricted to them, in the hope that they might be able to prise Muslims away from Islam and instead attach them to western ways.

They claimed and boasted that they were the harbingers of freedom and independence. They were, on the contrary, no more than the henchmen of the departed colonialists. They would, hypocritically, claim to be the protectors of the people, while at the same time perform as their hangmen. Marching hand in hand with their foreign sponsors, they deceived and misled many.

In each departed colony, colonialism left behind a time-bomb that would explode at a propitious time in the future. As the civilian nationalist elite failed to deliver the goods, these time-bombs began to explode. These bombs were in the form of the military of the new States. Soon the military elite began to take charge of the civilization goals of their former colonial masters with much greater vigour and oppression.

The period of colonialism is not over yet.

26. R. Arnaud, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
27. Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, Longmans, London, 1984, p. 293.

Notes

1. D. Cruise O'Brien, 'Towards an Islamic Policy in French West Africa', *Journal of African History*, Vol. VIII, 1967, pp. 303–16.
2. A. Gouilly, *L'Islam en Afrique Occidentale*, Paris, Larose, 1952, p. 257.
3. Report of Directeur des Affaires Politiques, Senegal, 8 July 1879, *Archives Nationales*, Section Outer-Mer (A.N.S.O.M.), Senegal VIII, 23 *bis*.
4. P. Marty, *Etudes sur l'Islam au Senegal*, II, Paris, Leroux, 1917, pp. 287–8.
5. A. Quellien, *La Politique Musulmane dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, Paris, Larose, 1910, p. 100.
6. D. Cruise O'Brien, *ibid.*, p. 305.
7. P. B. Clarke, *West Africa and Islam*, Edward Arnold, London, 1982, p. 189.
8. J. D. Hargreaves (ed.), *France and West Africa*, London, 1969, p. 148.
9. P. B. Clarke, *ibid.*, p. 190.
10. P. B. Clarke, *ibid.*, p. 191.
11. D. Cruise O'Brien, *ibid.*, p. 312.
12. A. Le Chatelier, 'Politique Musalmane', *Revue du Monde Musalman*, Vol. XII, September 1910, p. 80.
13. President of the Council (Combes) to Minister for the Colonies, 1 August, 1902, *A.N.S.O.M.*, Missions 115F.
14. R. Arnaud, *Précis des Politique Musalmane, 1, Pays Maures de la Rive Droit du Senegal*, Algiers, Jourdan, 1906, pp. 119–23.
15. D. Cruise O'Brien, *ibid.*, p. 310.
16. J. C. Froelich, *Essai sur les causes et methodes de l'Islamization de l'Afrique de l'Ouest du XIe siècle au XXe siècle*, mimeographed paper, International African Institute, Fifth Internal African Seminar, Zaria, 1963, p. 7.
17. D. Cruise O'Brien, *ibid.*, p. 314.
18. J. Brevie, *Islamisme Contre 'Naturisme' au Soudan Francais*, Paris, Leroux, 1923, pp. 257–62. Brevie was an adviser to Clozel and was later himself Governor-General.
19. D. Cruise O'Brien, *ibid.*, p. 315.
20. D. Cruise O'Brien, *ibid.*, p. 308.
21. P. B. Clarke, *ibid.*, p. 191.
22. R. Arnaud, *L'Islam et la Politique Musulmane Française en Afrique Occidentale*, Paris 1912, p. 126.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

Index

The Muslim world today is one of nation-States
where nationality and national interest stand above
Islam. A turning point has, however, been achieved.
In Iran, the political culture of the Muslim masses has
reasserted itself, breaking the mould of nationalism
and the nation-State.

This book explores the impact of nationalism on the
Muslim world. It should help to develop a better
understanding of nationalism in the context of Islam
and the Muslim political culture that has survived
colonialism.

Dr. M. Ghayasuddin is Research Fellow of the Muslim
Institute.

On the cover: Quaranic verse (23:52)
*And verily this brotherhood of yours is a single
brotherhood, and I am your Lord, so keep your duty
unto me.*